Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects

Abstract

Rob Wilson claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers. I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.

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