Responsibility and the emotions

In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Strawsonian tradition, a person is responsible for an action just in case it is appropriate to hold them responsible for that action. One important way of holding people responsible for wrongdoing is by experiencing and expressing blaming emotions. This raises the questions of what blaming emotions are and in what sense they can be appropriate. In this chapter I will provide an overview of different answers to both these questions. A common thread in the chapter will be a challenge for the Strawsonian tradition. Given that this tradition understands moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of blaming emotions, it must provide a realistic picture of these emotions and the practices in which they take part. On the other hand, it also aims to develop a normatively plausible account of the conditions of responsibility. I will try to show that it is often difficult to strike a satisfactory balance between these two aspirations

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 205-224.
Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
Responsibility and Dignity: Strawsonian Themes.Bennett W. Helm - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 217-34.
Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.
The Trilemma of Desert.Stephen Kershnar - 2006 - Public Affairs Quarterly 20 (3):219-233.
The reactive theory of emotions.Olivier Massin - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):785-802.
Can Emotions Communicate?Trip Glazer - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):234-242.
Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):273–285.
Responsibility for others' emotions.Sophie Rietti - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):27-44.
Rethinking Responsibility.K. E. Boxer - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-19

Downloads
275 (#72,014)

6 months
275 (#7,992)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andreas Brekke Carlsson
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references