Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions

Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.

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Zac Cogley
Ohio State University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
Contempt's Evaluative Presentation and Connection to Accountability.Zac Cogley - 2018 - In Michelle Mason (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Contempt. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 131-150.
Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.
Anger and Absurdity.Daniel Coren - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):717-732.
Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism.Linda Radzik - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):161-173.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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