Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33 (2015)
AbstractFree will is often said—by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike—to be a power (or complex of powers) of agents. This paper offers proposals for, and examines the prospects of, a powers-conception of free will that takes the powers in question to be causal dispositions. A difficulty for such an account stems from the idea that when one exercises free will, it is up to oneself whether one wills to do this or that. The paper also briefly considers whether a powers-conception that invokes powers of a different kind, such as agent-causal or noncausal powers, might fare better with respect to this problem.
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.
Unsettledness and the Intentionality of Practical Decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.
Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - In Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Perspekitven. Paderborn: Schoeningh. pp. 41-62.
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