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  1. Selfish Goals Must Compete for the Common Currency of Reward.George Ainslie - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):135-136.
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  2. Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will.Holly Andersen - manuscript
    Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious (...)
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  3. Motives, Intentions and Responsibility.Páll S. Árdal - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):146-154.
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  4. Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure?Horacio Arló-Costa - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  5. Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will.Nomy Arpaly - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in (...)
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  6. Theory of Action.Thomas Atwater - 1980 - New Scholasticism 54 (1):111-115.
  7. Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience.BA Aune - unknown
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  8. Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal Combatibilist Account, by Scott Sehon.Derek Baker - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
  9. Symposium: Intention, Motive and Responsibility.Winston H. F. Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones - 1945 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19 (1):230 - 288.
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  10. Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  11. Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.Benjamin Bayer - manuscript
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power to (...)
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  12. Motives and Intentions.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1980 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  13. Encyclopedia of Ethics.Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.) - 2001 - Routledge.
    The editors, working with a team of 325 renowned authorities in the field of ethics, have revised, expanded, and updated this classic encyclopedia. Along with the addition of 150 new entries, all of the original articles have been newly peer-reviewed and revised, bibliographies have been updated throughout, and the overall design of the work has been enhanced for easier access to cross-references and other reference features. New entries include * Aristotelian Ethics * Avicenna * Bad Faith * Beneficence * Categorical (...)
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  14. Action and the Will.Daniel Clark Bennett - 1960 - Dissertation, Stanford University
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  15. How Can an Agent Rationally Guide His Actions?Monika Betzler - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):159-177.
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  16. McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency.J. Bishop - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  17. Natural Agency.John Bishop - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):287-290.
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  18. "Massive Voluntarism" or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will.Vincent Blok - 2013 - Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  19. 'Massive Voluntarism' or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will.Vincent Blok - 2013 - Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  20. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  21. Is Acting Willing?Jean Beer Blumenfeld - 1983 - Noûs 17 (2):183-195.
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  22. Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation.Stephen Boulter - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  23. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Myles Brand & Alan Donagan - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):115.
  24. Sharing Fate: Contractualism, Individualism and Collective Agency.Jeffrey Charles Brand-Ballard - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    In this project I develop a theory of collective agency for Kantian social contract theory . Contractualists lack a unified, coherent theory of agency. At some points they endorse an individualistic theory of the agent. Elsewhere they recognize the possibility of collective agents, but they never take seriously the concept of an irreducibly collective agent. ;Contractualism makes more sense, and can better achieve its own goals, if reinterpreted in terms of a theory of agency which avoids these equivocations. Drawing on (...)
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  25. Agents and Their Actions.Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) - 2001 - Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  26. Overvold on Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice.R. B. Brandt - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:353-363.
    In order to explain the idea that sacrifice involves voluntary diminution of the agent’s well-being, “well-being” must be explained. The thesis that an agent’s well-being just consists in the occurrence of events wanted is rejected. Overvold replaces it by the view that the motivating desires involve the existence of the agent, alive, at the time of their satisfaction. This view seems counterintuitive. The whole desire-satisfaction theory is to be rejected partly because we dont’t think an event worthwile if it is (...)
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  27. Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of WillBy Alfred R. Mele.J. Bransen - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):585-587.
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  28. Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint.Michael E. Bratman - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  29. Autonomy and Hierarchy.Michael E. Bratman - 2003 - Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
    In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal to higher-order conative attitudes. Frankfurt's original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act. Rather, it is also (...)
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  30. Thought, Action, and Acting Against One's Best Judgment.Michael Edward Bratman - 1974 - Dissertation, The Rockefeller University
  31. The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  32. On Voluntary Action and its Hierarchical Structure* Jerome S. Bruner.Jerome S. Bruner - 1969 - In Arthur Koestler & John R. Smythies (eds.), Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences. London: Hutchinson. pp. 161.
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  33. Schelling on the Possibility of Evil: Rendering Pantheism, Freedom and Time Consistent.G. Anthony Bruno - forthcoming - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy.
    German idealism stems in large part from Fichte’s response to a dilemma involving the concepts of pantheism, freedom and time: either time is the form of the determination of modes of substance, as held by a pantheistic or ‘dogmatic’ person, or the form of acts generated by human freedom, as held by an idealistic person. Fichte solves the dilemma by refuting dogmatism and deducing time from idealism’s first principle. But his diagnosis is more portentous: by casting the lemmas in terms (...)
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  34. Maria Alvarez , Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action . Reviewed By.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (4):245-247.
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  35. Rational and Irrational Agency.Peter G. Campbell - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed (...)
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  36. Puzzles for the Will.Richmond Campbell - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (3):634-635.
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  37. Internalism and Self-Determination.George Carlson - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:415-427.
    As part of an attempt to give a “libertarian” account of some aspects of human agency, the author articulates and defends a modified interpretation of “internalism” which makes coherent the notion of a genuinely, self-determined choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical reason. That such choices are “nomologically irreducible” is evidenced by the fact that although (contextually) unavoidable, they are nonetheless under-determined with respect to any combination of the agent’s (specific) desires and circumstances. Alternatively, to the extent that orthodox “externalism” subordinates (...)
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  38. Kane is Not Able: A Reply to Vicens' 'Self-Forming Actions and Conflicts of Intention'.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):21-26.
  39. Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso (ed.) - 2013 - Lexington Books.
    This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility play in our (...)
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  40. Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - Lexington Books.
    This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.
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  41. Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This introductory chapter discusses the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications--including the debate between Saul Smilansky's "illusionism," Thomas Nadelhoffer's "disillusionism," Shaun Nichols' "anti-revolution," and the "optimistic skepticism" of Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Tamler Sommers, and others.
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  42. Aquinas's Account of Double Effect.Thomas Cavanaugh - 1997 - The Thomist 61:107-121.
    Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and leads to (...)
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  43. Book Review:Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW]Marcia Cavell - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):429-.
  44. Locke on the Suspension of Desire. Chappell - 1998 - Locke Studies 29:23-38.
    In the first edition of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke claims that human beings have freedom of action - that is, that some of their actions are free - but that they do not have freedom of will - that is, that none of their volitions are free. Volitions themselves are actions for Locke; they are operations of the will and hence acts of willing. And volitions give rise to other actions: an action that follows and is caused by (...)
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  45. Free Willing: Comments on Hoffman's “Freedom and Strength of Will”.Vere Chappell - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):273 - 281.
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  46. Recensement: Hyman - Action, Knowledge and Will. [REVIEW]Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2015 - Philosophiques 42 (2):435-440.
    Ce compte-rendu résume les quatre dimensions de la philosophie de l’ action défendue dans Action, Knowledge and Will : physique, éthique, psychologique et intellectuel. Cela dit, les deux contributions principales du livre recensé relèvent de liens entre les différentes dimensions de l’ action. Il s’agit d’une distinction et d’une connexion. Premièrement, Hyman croit qu’il faut distinguer la dimension éthique et la dimension physique de l’ action. Plus précisément, il pense que le concept de volonté et le concept de volontaire doivent (...)
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  47. Decomposing the Will.Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
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  48. Review: Thomas Pink's The Psychology of Freedom (1996 CUP). [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):634-637.
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  49. Free Will and Agential Powers.Randolph Clarke & Thomas Reed - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33.
    Free will is often said—by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike—to be a power (or complex of powers) of agents. This paper offers proposals for, and examines the prospects of, a powers-conception of free will that takes the powers in question to be causal dispositions. A difficulty for such an account stems from the idea that when one exercises free will, it is up to oneself whether one wills to do this or that. The paper also briefly considers whether a powers-conception that (...)
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  50. Blame: Its Nature and Norms.Coates D. Justin & A. Tognazzini Neal (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    What is it to blame someone, and when are would-be blamers in a position to do so? What function does blame serve in our lives, and is it a valuable way of relating to one another? The essays in this volume explore answers to these and related questions.
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