Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):753-766 (2018)

Authors
Charlie Crerar
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption—that, just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that we aren't. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false: motivational approaches cannot explain a range of intuitive cases of intellectual vice. The popularity of the assumption is accounted for by its being a manifestation of a more general understanding of vice as an inversion or mirror image of virtue. I call this the inversion thesis, and argue that the failure of the motivational approach to vice exposes its limitations. I conclude by suggesting that recognizing these limitations can help to encourage philosophical interest in intellectual vice.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1394334
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References found in this work BETA

A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
Vice Epistemology has a Responsibility Problem.Heather Battaly - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):24-36.

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