9 found
Order:
See also
Lukas Schwengerer
University of Duisburg-Essen
  1. Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (3):312-322.
    The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a particular (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. Self-Knowledge in a Predictive Processing Framework.Lukas Schwengerer - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):563-585.
    In this paper I propose an account of self-knowledge based on a framework of predictive processing. Predictive processing understands the brain as a prediction-action machine that tries to minimize error in its predictions about the world. For this view to evolve into a complete account of human cognition we ought to provide an idea how it can account for self-knowledge – knowledge of one’s own mental states. I provide an attempt for such an account starting from remarks on introspection made (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  11
    Unified Transparency Account of Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    In this thesis I propose an account of knowledge of one’s own mental states. My goal is set on a unified transparency account of self-knowledge. It is unified, because the proposal will account for the generation of beliefs about mental states of all types, regardless of whether they are propositional, non-propositional, experiential or non-experiential. My account will thereby be applicable to knowledge of any mental state, from beliefs and desires to fears, hopes, and sensations such as pain. Moreover, it will (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  40
    An Epistemic Condition for Playing a Game.Lukas Schwengerer - 2018 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13 (3-4):293-306.
    In 'The Grasshopper' Suits proposes that ‘playing a game’ can be captured as an attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (prelusory goal), using only means permitted by rules (lusory means). These rules prohibit more efficient means, and are accepted because they make the activity possible (lusory attitude). I argue these conditions are not jointly sufficient. The starting point for the argument is the idea that goals, means and attitudes can pick out their content in different ways. They can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  64
    Beliefs Over Avowals: Setting Up the Discourse on Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):66-81.
    Wright (1998) and Bar-On (2004) put pressure on the idea that self-knowledge as an explanandum should be identified with privileged belief formation. They argue that setting up the discourse on the level of belief and belief formation rules out promising approaches to explain self-knowledge. Hence, they propose that we should characterize self-knowledge on the level of linguistic practice instead. I argue against them that self-knowledge cannot be fully characterized by features of our linguistic practice. I propose that in some circumstances (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  61
    Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Justification.Lukas Schwengerer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Jennifer Lackey challenged group acceptance accounts of justification by arguing that these accounts make the possession of evidence arbitrary and hence lead to illegitimate manipulation of the group's evidence. She proposes that the only way out is to rely on the epistemic propriety of the individual group members, which leads to a dilemma for group acceptance views: either they are wrong about justification, or they cease to rely only on group acceptances. I argue that there is a third option based (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  52
    Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Robert William Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts. Springer. pp. 231-251.
    Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  82
    Revisiting Online Intellectual Virtues.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (3):38-45.
  9. Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark