Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460 (1997)

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.
Keywords Emotion  Evolution  Fear  Intentionality  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1086/392560
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