Two faces of intentionality

Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460 (1997)
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Abstract

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.

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Explaining Behaviour.F. Dretske - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):157-165.

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