After Survivalism and Corruptionism: Separated Souls as Incomplete Persons

Quaestiones Disputatae 10 (2):161-176 (2020)
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Thomas Aquinas consistently defended the thesis that the separated rational soul that results from a human person’s death is not a person. Nevertheless, what has emerged in recent decades is a sophisticated disputed question between “survivalists” and “corruptionists” concerning the personhood of the separated soul that has left us with intractable disagreements wherein neither side seems able to convince the other. In our contribution to this disputed question, we present a digest of an unconsidered middle way: the separated soul is an incomplete person.



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Author Profiles

Brandon Dahm
Franciscan University of Steubenville
Daniel D. De Haan
University of Oxford

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