Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):45-62 (2003)
I argue that the physical marks on a canvas resulting from an artist's intentional, stylistic and expressive acts cannot themselves be the artist's expression, but instead they serve to signify or indicate those acts. Thus there is a kind of indicative content associated with a picture that is distinct from its subject matter (or 'representational content'). I also argue that this kind of indicative content is closely associated with the specific artistic medium chosen by the artist as her expressive medium, for which reason I call this kind of content medium content (or medium-related content).
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Resemblance, Restriction, and Content-Bearing Features.John Dilworth - 2005 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):67–70.
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