Why expressivists about value should not love minimalism about truth

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Analysis 54 (1):12-19 (1994)
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10.1093/analys/54.1.12

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Citations of this work

Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23-44.
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.

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