Noûs 46 (1):1-23 (2012)

Authors
Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas
Abstract
The demandingness of act consequentialism is well-known and has received much sophisticated treatment.1 Few have been content to defend AC’s demands. Much of the response has been to jettison AC in favor of a similar, though significantly less demanding view.2 The popularity of this response is easy to understand. Excessive demandingness appears to be a strong mark against any moral theory. And if excessive demandingness is a worry of this kind, AC’s goose appears cooked: attempts to show that AC is not particularly demanding are implausible at best. Given that AC requires agents to promote goodness, and given that “goodness” here is most often construed as impartial and aggregative between persons, were I in a position to save others from death by sacrificing myself, I am morally required, on.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00777.x
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