The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended

Theoria 15 (1):11-31 (2000)

Phil Dowe
Australian National University
I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of “cause” to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria20001512
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,328
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On the Causal Completeness of Physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
93 ( #91,760 of 2,280,319 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #402,375 of 2,280,319 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature