Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger by David W. JohnsonLaÿna DrozDavid W. Johnson, Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2019.Recently, Watsuji Tetsurō’s work has drawn wide interest, in particular around his concept of fūdo and his approach to ethics. The word fūdo (風土) is composed of the Chinese character for the wind, and the character for the soil. It attempts to grasp the relation between humans and their environment while recognizing the essential subjectivity of the relation itself. David W. Johnson’s book is thus timely. In Watsuji on Nature, Johnson focuses on what he refers to as “Watsuji’s philosophy of nature” (3). Thanks to his interpretation of Watsuji’s idea of fūdo, Johnson aims at “reenchanting nature” and at giving us “the possibility of finding ourselves at home in the world once again” (49). This quest already sets the stage for Johnson’s argument that seems to be addressed to an English-speaking audience and to attempt to reconcile a particular Western conception of nature with Watsuji’s concept of fūdo. Within these parameters, his reasoning flows clearly and Johnson guides us elegantly through his interpretation of Watsuji across the eight chapters of his book.In the first chapter, Johnson traces the history of the concept of fūdo, and the difficulties it presents for translation. He briefly discusses ongoing conflicts of interpretation, namely the tension between nature and culture, and the issue of natural determinism. Johnson rejects the “equation of fūdo with everything that environs a human being” (31), for fear that it might reduce its explanatory power and “render this notion almost useless” (32). Instead, Johnson proposes to follow two criteria to clarify what the philosophical concept of fūdo entails. The first criterion “comes from nature itself, which is a kind of given that presents certain regions as articulated wholes around which boundaries can be drawn” (34), which Johnson claims is found in Watsuji’s “taxonomy of basic types of fūdo.” With the second criterion, Johnson aims at distinguishing “nature from artifice,” and draws the line as follows: “A newly created species of crop and a reservoir count as constituents of a fūdo; the installation of telephone poles and the erection [End Page 129] of skyscrapers do not, even though they affect the space and scenery of a landscape” (37). Johnson insists that the plant and the river are a “sheerly given self-unfolding of things.” This particular Heideggerian interpretation of Watsuji’s fūdo is the cornerstone of Johnson’s reasoning and of his description of Watsuji’s philosophy of nature.Arguably, more philological references would have been beneficial to defend such a controversial interpretation of the concept of fūdo. For example, Watsuji writes in the first line of the first chapter of Fūdo that fūdo is a “general term including for a particular region, climate, weather, geology, soil quality, geographical features, landscape (keikan 景観) etc.”1 Later, in Rinrigaku (倫理学), he defines and discusses the landscape as “an internal scene in the human existence; it is not an environment which surrounds from the outside human beings.”2 Furthermore, he insists that far from being a given, “the environment or natural region” is changed by human activities3 throughout history—which contrasts with Johnson’s first criterion that characterizes fūdo in terms of natural regions that appear as “a given” from nature. Watsuji also specifies that in this “environment or nature,” we have “cultivated countryside, planted mountain areas, towns lined with water streams, and villages scattered across the plains,” which are nothing but the “shape” of the human groups. Thus, Johnson’s second criterion that draws a line between human-made artifice and nature seems to conflict with Watsuji’s recurrent emphasis on the dynamicity and inseparability of human activities and their landscape, which includes villages, and thus would probably include telephone poles and skyscrapers. Moreover, Johnson’s distinction between artificial and natural does not evade central problems that have been lengthily discussed in the interdisciplinary field of environmental philosophy, such as the difficulties of defining...