How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology

Erkenntnis 85 (4):995-1022 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The four principal competing substance ontologies are substratum theory, bundle theory, primitive substance theory, and hylomorphism. Both historically and in the recent literature, most arguments pertaining to these four theories have been developed under the assumption that only one of them can be true. However there is room in this debate for various forms of pluralism: mild pluralism here refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one other possible world in which a different substance ontology obtains; moderate pluralism refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one other possible world in which multiple substance ontologies obtain ; and extreme pluralism refers to the view that our own actual world contains substances belonging to different substance ontologies. In this paper I lay out a novel argument for a version of extreme pluralism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

God as Substance Without Substance Ontology.Wachter Daniel von - 2007 - In Christian Kanzian & Muhammed Legenhausen (eds.), Substance and Attribute: Western and Islamic Traditions in Dialogue. Ontos Verlag. pp. 237-245, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
Disentangling Nature's Joints.Tuomas Tahko - 2017 - In William Simpson, Robert Koons & Nicholas Teh (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. Routledge. pp. 147-166.
Goal-Dependence in Ontology.David Danks - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3601-3616.
A New Argument for the Incompatibility of Hylomorphism and Metaphysical Naturalism.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89:119-130.
On the True and the Real.Michael P. Lynch - 1995 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
An Argument for Hylomorphism or Theism.Travis Dumsday - 2012 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86:245-254.
An Argument for Hylomorphism or Theism.Travis Dumsday - 2012 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86:245-254.
The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219.
Substance and Identity-Dependence.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):103-118.
La natura e l'identità degli oggetti materiali.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi. Carocci Editore. pp. 17–56.
Substance Among Other Categories.Joshua Hoffman & Gary S. Rosenkrantz - 1994 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-21

Downloads
51 (#228,348)

6 months
2 (#277,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Travis Dumsday
Concordia University of Edmonton

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

View all 130 references / Add more references