Abstract

The Coherence Theory of Truth does not stand upon its own feet; it is the corollary of a metaphysic, without which it has no claim to credence and is without cogency. Likewise, no critique of the theory can have weight against it if it merely assumes an incompatible metaphysic which it does not validate and unless it can demonstrate the falsity of that on which the Coherence Theory rests. If metaphysics is simply a matter of taste and temperament discussion and criticism become futile, but that metaphysics is simply a matter of taste and sentiment is an exploded doctrine. It can obviously not be maintained because it rests upon a metaphysic in its turn, for it follows from the belief that the world and the human mind are such that we can acquire knowledge of facts originally only through particular sense impressions which can never by their nature convey to us ultimate general truths about reality. This is a metaphysical presupposition and is thus incompetent to extrude metaphysics from the sphere of rational knowledge.