Property counterparts and natural class trope nominalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463 (2004)
Abstract
'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as applied to properties.
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DOI 10.1080/713659878
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Non-Qualitative Properties.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
Modal Realisms.Kris McDaniel - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331.

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