Constructing a World for the Senses

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99 (2013)
Abstract
It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed.
Keywords perceptual intentionality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0006
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.David Papineau - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
Presentational Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad J. Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
What is Consciousness?Norton Nelkin - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Synthetic Unities of Experience.Leslie Stevenson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
Perceptual Phenomenology and Direct Realism.Caleb Liang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:103-148.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2013-06-17

Total downloads

165 ( #27,046 of 2,154,175 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

36 ( #8,646 of 2,154,175 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums