In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind (2014)

Carrie Figdor
University of Iowa
I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of inattentional blindness philosophers of mind have shown when it comes to conceiving of their explanandum as a kind of complex activity. I also show how the project of naturalizing the mind is altered when we correct for this inattention.
Keywords mechanistic explanation of mind  naturalizing the mind  mental activities  ontology of mind  metaphysics of mind
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