Davidson on the Impossibility of Thought without Language. Comments on Diana I. Pérez

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):489-494 (2012)
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Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated.

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Marcelo Fischborn
Instituto Federal Farroupilha

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References found in this work

.Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) - 1985 - Blackwell.
Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
The problem of objectivity.D. Davidson - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (2):203-220.
What thought requires.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 121.

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