"Akrasia": Basic and Supplementary Features
Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University (
1999)
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Abstract
The dissertation is an attempt to become more clear about akrasia or incontinence , and the relations among various accounts. In the first chapter, I attempt to distinguish akratic acts from other similar acts. Though I distinguish akratic acts, the description is problematic. It involves features that some philosophers reject as being involved in akrasia. Further, it involves features that some philosophers believe are inessential to akrasia. I argue that no set of features is both involved in all accounts of akrasia and sufficient for an akratic act. There is, however, a set of features common among the accounts: I identify a set of basic features. Though these features are not sufficient for an akratic act, they are involved in each account. ;In the second chapter, I demonstrate agreement and disagreement among six dfferent accounts. I show that the basic features are involved in each account. Also, I categorize the disagreements. I argue that philosophers disagree about: the frequency, the features of the objects involved, the features of the judgment, and the features of the action. ;In the body of the dissertation, I evaluate the cogency of six accounts. To do so, I contrast the basic features with each author's supplementary features. I accept an account, if all the supplementary features are supported by cogent argument. I begin with Plato's account in Protagoras and move to his account in Republic IV. I consider Aristotle's account in Nicomachean Ethics, VII.3. Finally, I evaluate the accounts of Donald Davidson in "How is Weakness of Will Possible," Alfred Mele in Irrationality , and Michael Stocker in Plural and Conflicting Values. ;In the final chapter, I explore Am6lie Rorty's thesis in "Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place." She argues that there are four types of akrasia: akrasia of direction, interpretation, irrationality, and character. I place the accounts in Rorty's taxonomy and conclude that my sample offers a cogent account of only three types. My sample does not offer a cogent account of akrasia of irrationality