Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):280-307 (2001)

Authors
Juliet Floyd
Boston University
Abstract
A survey of current evidence available concerning Wittgenstein's attitude toward, and knowledge of, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, including his discussions with Turing, Watson and others in 1937–1939, and later testimony of Goodstein and Kreisel; 2) Discussion of the philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein's attitude toward Gödel's and other theorems in mathematical logic, contrasting this attitude with that of, e.g., Penrose; 3) Replies to an instructive criticism of my 1995 paper by Mark Steiner which assesses the importance of Tarski's semantical work, both for our understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel, and our understanding of Gödel's theorem itself.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/9.3.280
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
Grundlagen der Mathematik.S. C. Kleene - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):16-20.

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Citations of this work BETA

Truth in the Investigations.Nicoletta Bartunek - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4091-4111.
The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons.Francesco Berto - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.

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