Evolution and the classification of social behavior

Biology and Philosophy 30 (3):405-421 (2015)
Patrick Forber
Tufts University
Rory Smead
Northeastern University
Recent studies in the evolution of cooperation have shifted focus from altruistic to mutualistic cooperation. This change in focus is purported to reveal new explanations for the evolution of prosocial behavior. We argue that the common classification scheme for social behavior used to distinguish between altruistic and mutualistic cooperation is flawed because it fails to take into account dynamically relevant game-theoretic features. This leads some arguments about the evolution of cooperation to conflate dynamical scenarios that differ regarding the basic conditions on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We use the tools of evolutionary game theory to increase the resolution of the classification scheme and analyze what evolutionary inferences classifying social behavior can license
Keywords Evolution  Cooperation  Hamilton’s rule  Social behavior  Evolutionary game theory
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-015-9486-y
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References found in this work BETA

Evolution and the Levels of Selection.Samir Okasha - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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