Abstract

Illusionism is a revisionary view of consciousness, which denies the existence of the phenomenal properties traditionally thought to render experience conscious. The view has theoretical attractions, but some think it also has objectionable ethical implications. They take illusionists to be denying the existence of consciousness itself, or at least of the thing that gives consciousness its ethical value, and thus as undermining our established ethical attitudes. This article responds to this objection. I argue that, properly understood, illusionism neither denies the existence of consciousness nor entails that consciousness does not ground ethical value. It merely offers a different account of what consciousness is and why it grounds ethical value. The article goes on to argue that the theoretical revision proposed by illusionists does have some indirect implications for our ethical attitudes but that these are wholly attractive and progressive ones. The illusionist perspective on consciousness promises to make ethical decision making easier and to extend the scope of our ethical concern. Illusionism is good news.