Why do we Suffer? Buddhism and the Problem of Evil

Philosophy Compass 10 (5):345-353 (2015)

Sebastian Gäb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
This paper explains the Buddhist concept of suffering and its relation to the Christian problem of evil. Although there is no problem of evil in Buddhism, the Buddhist understanding of the origin and causes of suffering will help us to find new approaches to the problem of evil. More specifically, I argue that the concept of evil can be interpreted in terms of dukkha; that the existence of suffering or dukkha is necessarily inevitable for finite beings, given the metaphysical structure of the world and ourselves; and that this reasoning can be interpreted as a defense against the problem of evil
Keywords Buddhism  problem of evil  suffering
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12207
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William L. Rowe - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.
Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant?Richard J. Hall - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59.
The Concept of Evil.Marcus G. Singer - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (2):185-214.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
406 ( #14,386 of 2,292,073 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
87 ( #7,439 of 2,292,073 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature