Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people

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Chapters

A Limited Intuitionist Faculty

This chapter suggests one mechanism by which we might be able to come to a priori knowledge about certain relations between the referents of response-dependent terms. And it suggests why this mechanism could underwrite our knowledge about the link between rationality and aversion to harm. ... see more

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Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary

Citations of this work

Anger and moral judgment.Glen Pettigrove - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):269-286.
Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.

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