Oxford University Press (2012)

Authors
Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary
Abstract
Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people
Keywords Normativity (Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2012
Buy this book $45.72 used (43% off)   $61.56 new (23% off)   Amazon page
Call number BJ1458.3.G474 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199657544   0199657548
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,214
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA
A Limited Intuitionist Faculty

This chapter suggests one mechanism by which we might be able to come to a priori knowledge about certain relations between the referents of response-dependent terms. And it suggests why this mechanism could underwrite our knowledge about the link between rationality and aversion to harm. ... see more

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.
Anger and Moral Judgment.Glen Pettigrove - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):269-286.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):718-742.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason.H. Lillehammer - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190.
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
The Idea of a Normative Reason.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. pp. 41--65.
Parfit’s Challenges.Marko Jurjako - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):237-248.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-26

Total views
27 ( #423,362 of 2,507,637 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,871 of 2,507,637 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes