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  1. Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect.Alexander Greenberg - forthcoming - Cambridge Law Journal.
    A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or ‘tracing’ approach, i.e. an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it can’t account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it can’t account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be (...)
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  2. Ought Implies Can, Asymmetrical Freedom, and the Practical Irrelevance of Transcendental Freedom.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness.
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  3. Can Morally Ignorant Agents Care Enough?Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-19.
    Theorists attending to the epistemic condition on responsibility are divided over whether moral ignorance is ever exculpatory. While those who argue that reasonable expectation is required for blameworthiness often maintain that moral ignorance can excuse, theorists who embrace a quality of will approach to blameworthiness are not sanguine about the prospect of excuses among morally ignorant wrongdoers. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that moral ignorance always reflects insufficient care for what matters morally, and therefore that moral ignorance never excuses. Furthermore, (...)
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  4. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
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  5. Circumstance, Answerability, and Luck.Lubomira Radoilska - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):155-167.
    This paper identifies a distinctive kind of moral luck, deep circumstantial luck, and then explores its effects on moral responsibility. A key feature of the phenomenon is that it is recurrent rather than one-off. It also affects agents across a wide range of situations making it difficult to detect. Deeply unlucky agents are subject to unfavourable moral assessments through no fault of their own both in specific cases and when they try to respond to such initial assessments. In this respect, (...)
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  6. Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability.Shawn Tinghao Wang - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the (...)
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  7. Compatibilism From the Inside Out.Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    In this article, I focus on internal dimensions of moral responsibility. I argue that if such dimensions are real -- and it seems they are -- then moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.
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  8. Zooming Irresponsibly Down the Slippery Slope.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Analysis.
    I show that some well known arguments against moral responsibility — most notably, Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument and Susan Wolf’s Troubling Train of Thought — reason in the following, unnatural way: if a clearly has some property that results in our saying that a is F, and if b less clearly has that property, then it is the case that b is F. I argue that this unnatural reasoning is not present in reasons-responsiveness theories of responsibility. I do so by (...)
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  9. It’s (Almost) All About Desert: On the Source of Disagreements in Responsibility Studies.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article I discuss David Shoemaker’s recently published piece “Responsibility: The State of the Question. Fault Lines in the Foundations.” While agreeing with Shoemaker on many points, I argue for a more unified diagnosis of the seemingly intractable debates that plague (what I call) “responsibility studies.” I claim that, of the five fault lines Shoemaker identifies, the most basic one is about the role that the notion of deserved harm should play in the theory of moral responsibility. I argue (...)
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  10. Does Criminal Responsibility Rest Upon a False Supposition? No.Luke William Hunt - 2020 - Washington University Jurisprudence Review 13 (1):65-84.
    Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. The upshot is that (...)
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  11. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own.Bradford Stockdale - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-14.
    Frankfurt-style cases have famously served as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. The fine-grained version of the flicker defense has become one of the most popular responses to FSCs. Proponents of this defense argue that there is an alternative available to all agents in FSCs such that the cases do not show that PAP is false. Specifically, the agents could have done otherwise than decide on their own, and this available alternative is robust enough to ground moral responsibility. In (...)
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  12. Review of Ignorance Of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Douglas Husak. [REVIEW]Stephen Bero - 2017 - Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Books 2017 (March).
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  13. Summa Theologica (1273).Thomas Aquinas - 1947 - New York: Benziger Bros..
  14. Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668.
    Moral responsibility requires that we are in control of what we do. Many contemporary accounts of responsibility cash out this control in terms of abilities and hold that the relevant abilities are strong abilities, like general abilities. This paper raises a problem for strong abilities views: an agent can plausibly be morally responsible for an action or omission, despite lacking any strong abilities to do the relevant thing. It then offers a way forward for ability‐based views, arguing that very weak (...)
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  15. Inverse Enkrasia and the Real Self.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):228-236.
    Non‐reflectivist real self views claim that people are morally responsible for all and only those bits of conduct that express their true values and cares, regardless of whether they have endorsed them or not. A phenomenon that is widely cited in support of these views is inverse akrasia, that is, cases in which a person is praiseworthy for having done the right thing for the right reasons despite her considered judgment that what she did was wrong. In this paper I (...)
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  16. The Neuroscience of Human Morality. Three Levels of Normative Implications.Jon Leefmann - 2020 - In Does Neuroscience Have Normative Implications? Cham: pp. 1-22.
    Debates about the implications of empirical research in the natural and social sciences for normative disciplines have recently gained new attention. With the widening scope of neuroscientific investigations into human mental activity, decision-making and agency, neuroethicists and neuroscientists have extensively claimed that results from neuroscientific research should be taken as normatively or even prescriptively relevant. In this chapter, I investigate what these claims could possibly amount to. I distinguish and discuss three readings of the thesis that neuroscientific evidence has normative (...)
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  17. Moralna odgovornost i znanstvena slika svijeta.Jelena Mijić - 2020 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 40 (2):313-328.
    Predmet su rada rasprave o odnosu determinizma i slobode volje (tj. problem kompatibilnosti), odnosno implikacije koje imaju po moralnu odgovornost. Problemu se pristupa iz naturalističke perspektive iako se ne nudi odgovor na pitanje istine kauzalnog determinizma. Međutim, s ciljem da se ispita perspektiva za moralnu odgovornost, pretpostavlja se da je kauzalni determinizam potkrijepljen znanošću. Razmatra se pojam kauzalnog determinizma, a potom se ispituju izazovi koje argument konzekvenci postavlja pred slobodu volje shvaćenu kao mogućnost da se učini drugačije. Cilj je rada (...)
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  18. Identification and Self-Knowledge.Luca Malatesti & Filip Čeč - 2018 - In Patrizia Pedrini & Julie Kirsch (eds.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. New York, NY, USA: pp. 177-189.
    Recently, Matt King and Peter Carruthers have argued that the Real Self accounts of moral responsibility or autonomy are under pressure because they rely on a questionable conception of self-knowledge of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. In fact, they defend, as a plausible assumption, the claim that transparent self-knowledge of propositional attitudes is incompatible with mounting evidence in the cognitive sciences. In this chapter, we respond to this line of argument. We describe the types of self-knowledge that might (...)
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  19. Pattern Theory of Self and Situating Moral Aspects: The Need to Include Authenticity, Autonomy and Responsibility in Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation.Przemysław Zawadzki - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The aims of this paper are to: identify the best framework for comprehending multidimensional impact of deep brain stimulation on the self; identify weaknesses of this framework; propose refinements to it; in pursuing, show why and how this framework should be extended with additional moral aspects and demonstrate their interrelations; define how moral aspects relate to the framework; show the potential consequences of including moral aspects on evaluating DBS’s impact on patients’ selves. Regarding, I argue that the pattern theory of (...)
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  20. Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-Flopping.Fischer John Martin - 2016 - In Daniel Speak & Kevin Timpe (eds.), Free Will and Theism. Oxford: pp. 48-61.
    I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...)
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  21. Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - Ethics.
    It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not praiseworthy. I argue that unexcused impermissible acts can not only be pro tanto praiseworthy, but overall praiseworthy—and even more so than permissible alternatives. For example, there are cases in which it is impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue fewer rather than more strangers, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing no one. I develop a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can so radically come apart (...)
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  22. Review of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 6. [REVIEW]Daniel Story - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  23. Collective Continuity and Ontological Responsibility: Contesting the Pragmatic Approach in Ascribing Responsibility to Groups.Ionut Untea - 2019 - Ethical Perspectives 4 (26):583-621.
    The present paper challenges the view, rooted in the argument that groups lack a mind in the Davidsonian sense, that collective responsibility may be assessed mainly according to pragmatic criteria. I argue in favour of a kind of mental web of holistic collective attitudes and mindsets in the weak sense. I further connect this mental web to the dimension of collective responsibility via a reflection involving the existentialist dimension of Jaspers’ dilemma of seeing individuals in the position of having to (...)
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  24. Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)Justice.John Beverley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.
    Miranda Fricker’s original presentation of Hermeneutical Injustice left open theoretical choice points leading to criticisms and subsequent clarifications with the resulting dialectic appearing largely verbal. The absence of perspicuous exposition of hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice might suggest scenarios exhibiting some – but not all – such hallmarks are within its purview when they are not. The lack of clear hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice, moreover, obscures both the extent to which Fricker’s proposed remedy Hermeneutical Justice – roughly, virtuous communicative practices – (...)
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  25. Causation, Responsibility, and Typicality.Justin Sytsma - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    There is ample evidence that violations of injunctive norms impact ordinary causal attributions. This has struck some as deeply surprising, taking the ordinary concept of causation to be purely descriptive. Our explanation of the findings—the responsibility view—rejects this: we contend that the concept is in fact partly normative, being akin to concepts like responsibility and accountability. Based on this account, we predicted a very different pattern of results for causal attributions when an agent violates a statistical norm. And this pattern (...)
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  26. Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions.Matt King & Joshua May (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    How exactly do mental disorders affect one’s agency? How might therapeutic interventions help patients regain or improve their autonomy? Do only some disorders excuse morally inappropriate behavior, such as theft or child neglect? Or is there nothing about having a disorder, as such, that affects whether we ought to praise or blame someone for their moral success or failure? Our volume gathers together empirically-informed philosophers who are well equipped to tackle such questions. Contributors specialize in free will, agency, and responsibility, (...)
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  27. Self-Forming Acts and Other Miracles.László Bernáth - 2014 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 1 (58):104-116.
    Ferenc Huoranszki argues for two main claims in the ninth chapter of Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis (Huoranszki 2011). First, Huoranszki tries to show that libertarian restrictivism is false because self-determination in the libertarian sense is not necessary for our responsibility, even if motives, reasons or psychological characteristics can influence us relatively strongly to choose one or the other alternative. second, Huoranszki rejects the so-called manipulation argument.1 this is an argument for the conclusion that unless physical indeterminism is (...)
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  28. Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Anti-Suffragists.Lee Wilson - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of (...)
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  29. Born Which Way? ADHD, Situational Self-Control, and Responsibility.Polaris Koi - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic (...)
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  30. The Moral Psychology of Moral Responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - forthcoming - In John M. Doris & Manuel R. Vargas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology.
    In this chapter I survey the two main families of views about the moral psychology of moral responsibility, i.e., about the mental capacities or psychological functioning that distinguishes responsible agents from non-responsible agents. These are self-expression views, which maintain that responsible agency is essentially about being able to express one's practical stance or moral orientation in conduct; and reasons-responsiveness views, according to which responsible agency requires a suite of powers that make their possessors capable of detecting and responding apppropriately to (...)
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  31. Free Your Mind: Buddhism, Causality, and the Free Will Problem.Christian Coseru - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):461-473.
    The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self‐determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) (...)
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  32. Self-Deception as Omission.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):657-678.
    In this paper I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception in the philosophical literature and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts of self-deception is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (1) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible and (2) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on (...)
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  33. Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the Relevance of Neuroscience for Retributive Punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. It has recently been suggested that this (...)
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  34. Forms and Movements of Life.Zuzana Svobodová - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):89-105.
    Based on an analysis of the theory of the movement of existence, this paper answers the following question: Where can one see the most important connections of philosophical and religious language in the most re-thought part of Jan Patočkaʼs thinking? The third movement of life is seen as a form of the true philosophical life, but also as a form with metaphysical responsibility. The movement of breakthrough, or actual self-comprehension, is the most important, because it leads to care for the (...)
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  35. On Freedom and Responsibility: Discovering the Human as a Transcendent Being.Ciano Aydin - 2013 - Religion, State and Society 41 (2):88-102.
    This paper takes as a starting point the letter of Cardinal Angelo Sodano which is used as a preface in the various publications and translations of the Catholic Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. In this letter Sodano highlights an aspect that he believes deserves special attention: ‘men and women are invited above all to discover themselves as transcendent beings, in every dimension of their lives, including those related to social, economic and political contexts’. In my philosophical investigation (...)
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  36. Determinismus der Natur und Freiheit des Geistes. Die Rezeption Fichtes in Frankreich und die Ursprünge des französischen Spiritualismus, in Helmut Girndt (a cura di), „Natur“ in der Transzendentalphilosophie. Eine Tagung zum Gedenken an Reinhard Lauth, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2015, s. 373-406. [ISBN: 978-3-428-14535-5].Tommaso Valentini - 2015 - In Helmut Girndt (ed.), «Begriff und Konkretion. Beiträge zur Gegenwart der klassischen deutschen Philosphie». Berlino, Germania: pp. 373-406.
    In diesem Beitrag betrachte ich die Rezeption des Denkens von J.G. Fichte bei zwei Philosophen, die als die »Begründer des französischen Spiritualismus« gesehen werden können. Es geht um François-Pierre Maine de Biran (Bergerac 1766 - Paris 1824) und Joseph-Luis-Jules Lequier (Quintin 1814 - Saint-Briec 1862). Nach einer kurzen Gesamtdarstellung der Schwerpunkte beider beschäftige ich mich - in zwei verschieden Teilen - mit der historischen und philologischen Frage, was die französischen Philosophen wirklich von den Werken Fichtes gekannt beziehungsweise verstanden haben. Beide (...)
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  37. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility. By Bruce N. Waller. Pp. X, 294, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press, 2015, £26.95. [REVIEW]Patrick Madigan - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (2):361-362.
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  38. Humanism and the Death of God: Searching for the Good After Darwin, Marx, and Nietzsche. By Ronald E. Osborn. Pp. 256. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, £58.00. [REVIEW]Peter Joseph Fritz - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (2):364-365.
    Humanism and the Death of God is a critical exploration of secular humanism and its discontents. Through close readings of three exemplary nineteenth-century philosophical naturalists or materialists, who perhaps more than anyone set the stage for our contemporary quandaries when it comes to questions of human nature and moral obligation, Ronald E. Osborn argues that "the death of God" ultimately tends toward the death of liberal understandings of the human as well. Any fully persuasive defense of humanistic values - including (...)
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  39. Free Will: Real or Illusion - A Debate.Gregg D. Caruso, Christian List & Cory J. Clark - 2020 - The Philosopher 108 (1).
    Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.
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  40. The Hurricane Notebook: Three Dialogues on the Human Condition.Alexander Jech - 2019 - Wilmington, NC, USA: Wisdom/Works.
    “No lies": The Hurricane Notebook, found on a Wilmington beach after a storm, contains the thoughts, artistic experiments, vignettes, and recorded dialogues of an unknown author calling herself "Elizabeth M." Its entries record the inner life of a soul in crisis, perpetually returning to the moment she learned of her sister's suicide and making an unrelenting attempt to understand herself and the human condition. Whether engaged in introspective soul-searching, or reconstructing her discussions with friends, mentors, and acquaintances, she challenges herself (...)
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  41. To Be Able to, or to Be Able Not To? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.
    A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...)
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  42. Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3-20.
    While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, (...)
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  43. Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy: Killing Time.Christopher Bartel - 2020 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Is it ever morally wrong to enjoy fantasizing about immoral things? Many video games allow players to commit numerous violent and immoral acts. But, should players worry about the morality of their virtual actions? A common argument is that games offer merely the virtual representation of violence. No one is actually harmed by committing a violent act in a game. So, it cannot be morally wrong to perform such acts. While this is an intuitive argument, it does not resolve the (...)
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  44. Transmuted Goods and the Legacy of the Atrocity Paradigm.Jill Hernandez - 2019 - Social Philosophy Today 35:103-114.
    This paper responds to a recent challenge posed to Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm by “transmuted goods,” or, goods which positively transmute victims of atrocity in ways which are difficult for the paradigm to explain. Whereas the legacy of Card’s atrocity paradigm will surely be its demand that we hold others culpable for allowing and perpetuating systems of harm which threaten our ability to flourish, this paper suggests a way for the paradigm to incorporate transmuted goods in a manner that strengthens (...)
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  45. Moral Worth and Consciousness: In Defense of a Value-Secured Reliability Theory.John W. Robison - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    What minimal role—if any—must consciousness of morally significant information play in an account of moral worth? According to one popular view, a right action is morally worthy only if the agent is conscious (in some sense) of the facts that make it right. I argue against this consciousness condition and close cousins of it. As I show, consciousness of such facts requires much more sophistication than writers typically suggest—this condition would bar from moral worth most ordinary, intuitively morally worthy agents. (...)
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  46. Implicit Bias.Alex Madva - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (5th Edition).
    (This contribution is primarily based on "Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility," (2018) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. This version has been shortened and significantly revised to be more accessible and student-oriented.) Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence (...)
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  47. Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: An Ethical Metaphysics of Reasons.Kevin Houser - 2018 - In Michael L. Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Levinas. pp. 587-614.
    Recent analytic philosophy often explains our responsibility to one another in terms of normative reasons. Emmanuel Levinas thinks this is backwards. We are not responsible to one another because we have reasons to be. For reasons are themselves something we are responsible to one another to have; and it is only because we are responsible to one another for them that we are able to have our own reasons. Put broadly: Reasons-responsiveness is a form of responsiveness to persons. Standard reasons-first (...)
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  48. Self Control and Moral Security.Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. New York, NY, USA: pp. 33-63.
    Self-control is integral to successful human agency. Without it we cannot extend our agency across time and secure central social, moral, and personal goods. But self-control is not a unitary capacity. In the first part of this paper we provide a taxonomy of self-control and trace its connections to agency and the self. In part two, we turn our attention to the external conditions that support successful agency and the exercise of self-control. We argue that what we call moral security (...)
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  49. Free Will, the Self and the Brain.Gilberto Gomes - 2007 - Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2 (25):221-234.
    The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that (...)
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  50. Que tipo de determinação é compatível com que tipo de liberdade? – Uma resposta a Marcelo Fischborn.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 2 (20):113-127.
    While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have (...)
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