Revisionary dispositionalism and practical reason

The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.

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Author's Profile

Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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