Models as products of interdisciplinary exchange: Evidence from evolutionary game theory

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):386-397 (2011)
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Abstract

The development of evolutionary game theory is closely linked with two interdisciplinary exchanges: the import of game theory into biology, and the import of biologists’ version of game theory into economics. This paper traces the history of these two import episodes. In each case the investigation covers what exactly was imported, what the motives for the import were, how the imported elements were put to use, and how they related to existing practices in the respective disciplines. Two conclusions emerged from this study. First, concepts derived from the unity of science discussion or the unification accounts of explanation are too strong and too narrow to be useful for analysing these interdisciplinary exchanges. Secondly, biology and economics—at least in relation to EGT—show significant differences in modelling practices: biologists seek to link EGT models to concrete empirical situations, whereas economists pursue conceptual exploration and possible explanation.Keywords: Models; Evolutionary game theory; Interdisciplinarity; Unification; Unity of science; Theory import; Biology; Economics.

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Till Grüne-Yanoff
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

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Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.Robert L. Trivers - 1971 - Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1):35-57.
Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints.Uskali Mäki - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3):351-380.

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