Philosophical Studies 133 (1):55-81 (2007)

Authors
Elizabeth Harman
Princeton University
Abstract
Part One addresses the question whether the fact that some persons love something, worship it, or deeply care about it, can endow moral status on that thing. I argue that the answer is “no.” While some cases lend great plausibility to the view that love or worship can endow moral status, there are other cases in which love or worship clearly fails to endow moral status. Furthermore, there is no principled way to distinguish these two types of cases, so we must conclude that love or worship never endow moral status. Part Two takes up the hard question of why we have to be careful of things that others love or worship, given that the things do not thereby have moral status. I argue that it is sometimes bad for those who love or worship the things if we mistreat them. I develop an account of when love and worship, and person projects more generally, succeed in expanding the scope of what counts as good or bad for the person engaged in the project.
Keywords Abortion  Desire  Environment  Fetus  Love  Moral status  Well-being  Worship
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9006-7
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References found in this work BETA

Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
The Potentiality Problem.Elizabeth Harman - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):173 - 198.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties.Nicolas Delon - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379.
For the Sake of a Stone? Inanimate Things and the Demands of Morality.Simon P. James - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):384-397.

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