Interest-Relative Invariantism [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195 (2007)
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Abstract

In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist

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00318205

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00070.x

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Stephen Schiffer
New York University

Citations of this work

Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.

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