Dialogue 36 (2):361-374 (1997)
Like Wittgenstein, John Searle believes that much of analytic philosophy—especially the philosophy of mind—is founded on confusion and falsehood. Unlike Wittgenstein, he does not consider this condition to be endemic to philosophy. As a result, Searle's dual goals in The Rediscovery of the Mind are to rid the philosophy of mind of the fundamental confusions that plague it, and to set the field on the path toward genuine progress. Thus, the book opens with a chapter entitled “What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?” and closes with “The Proper Study.” The text is a blend of old and new: Searle introduces several new ideas, the most important of which is his thesis of the unconscious, and incorporates them into theses that have figured prominently in his previous works. Even for those who will find little to agree with in this book, The Rediscovery of the Mind serves as a testament to the sheer scope and iconoclasm of Searle's work
|Keywords||Body Metaphysics Mind Unconscious Searle, J|
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References found in this work BETA
The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
Citations of this work BETA
Lycan on the Subjectivity of the Mental.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38.
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