Synthese 127 (1-2):7 - 19 (2001)
In the present day and age, it seems that every constructivist philosopher of mathematics and her brother wants to be known as an intuitionist. In this paper, It will be shown that such a self-identification is in most cases mistaken. For one thing, not any old (or new) constructivism is intuitionism because not any old relevant construction is carried out mentally in intuition, as Brouwer envisaged. (edited)
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic.Jennifer Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
Tracking Instability in Our Philosophical Judgments: Is It Intuitive?Jennifer Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.
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