Criticisme et chose en soi chez Kant et Fichte

Horizon Sociologique 6:01-26 (2012)
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In 1797, subsequent to Jacobi’s (1787) and Schulze’s (1792) objections against Kantian criticism, Fichte intends to “save” critical philosophy by evacuating the thing in itself of theoretical discourse. By doing this, Fichte sets out to develop a coherent – and definitive – version of critical philosophy, which amounts to a radicalised account of transcendental idealism. Yet, two years later (1799), Kant publicly dismisses Fichte’s project, refusing to characterise it as “critical.” What Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is missing, is precisely a foundation grounded on a “real object”. As we shall see, it is the status of the thing in itself which is highly problematic. This paper intends to show that Kantian criticism can coherently claim, thanks to a specific use of philosophical analogy, that the thing in itself transcendentally grounds phenomena.



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Maria Hotes
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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