How basic is the basic revisionary argument?

Analysis 68 (4):303-309 (2008)
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Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, validates a parallel argument that leads to conclusions that are unacceptable to classicists and intuitionists alike.



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Author Profiles

Luca Incurvati
University of Amsterdam
Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.

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References found in this work

How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.

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