Analysis 68 (4):303-309 (2008)
Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, validates a parallel argument that leads to conclusions that are unacceptable to classicists and intuitionists alike.
|Keywords||Logical revision Basic Revisionary Argument Intuitionistic logic|
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References found in this work BETA
On Being in a Quandary. Relativism Vagueness Logical Revisionism.C. J. G. Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):45--97.
If Omniscient Beings Are Dialetheists, Then so Are Anti-Realists.Jesper Kallestrup - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):252–254.
Citations of this work BETA
Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability: Reply to Cieslinski.J. Ketland - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):423-436.
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