Intentionalism and change blindness

Philosophia 36 (3):355-366 (2008)
Abstract
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative anti-intentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
Keywords Intentionalism  Change blindness  Consciousness  Intentional content
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9115-3
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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