Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis:1-15 (forthcoming)
Authors
Harold Langsam
University of Virginia
Abstract
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it. I argue that reductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because they mischaracterize its nature; in particular, they fail to recognize the sensory nature of experience’s phenomenal character. I argue that nonreductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because, although they recognize its sensory nature, they mislocate it.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-0031-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,097
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Experience and Intentional Content.Ian Phillips - 2005 - Dissertation, Oxford University
Intentionalism and Change Blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
Theories of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience.Thomas Crowther - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
Attention and Intentionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Qualia, Introspection, and Transparency.Renee Janelle Smith - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
Blur and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-07-11

Total views
21 ( #320,454 of 2,313,444 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #277,280 of 2,313,444 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature