Abstract

More than 80 years after his death, Husserl’s voluminous work remains an unexhausted resource for contemporary philosophy. This is true of his later work, but it is also true of his early text, Logical Investigations. Relying and building on work done by numerous scholars and philosophers, especially Dan Zahavi, Walter Hopp, Philipp Berghofer, and Declan Smithies, this dissertation is an attempt to utilize some resources in Logical Investigations in order, first, to help articulate an Husserlian descriptive account of phenomenal consciousness and apply it to the cognitive phenomenology debate in philosophy of mind, and, second, to help show the relevancy of Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology — which is effectively a functional account of phenomenal consciousness — to the debate over the role of phenomenal consciousness in epistemic justification. While these descriptive and functional accounts are not without their problems, they nevertheless provide an important perspective on these contemporary debates.