Abstract

St. Thomas Aquinas clearly believed that some actions must be avoided in all circumstances, but according to certain authors the descriptions of these acts presuppose a moral judgment, e.g., the term 'murder' means 'wrongful killing.' Other authors argue that some actions described apart from a moral judgment are always evil, e.g., 'killing an innocent person' is absolutely prohibited. This dissertation attempts to clarify Aquinas's position by answering two questions: how are actions described, and how are they morally evaluated? ;According to Aquinas human actions are characterized by their principle, which is the agent's intention. If Joe shoots a gun to kill a person, his act is best described as killing a man, not as making a noise; but if he shoots a gun to frighten a robin, his act is properly described as making a noise. ;Similarly, the moral character of an action depends upon its principle and not its effects. According to Aquinas the human good is found in an order to God, even as a teacher is good through an order to his students' knowledge. But an action has its order, and is good or evil, through its principle and not its effects. Thus, a teacher's action might be ordered to learning, and be a good act of teaching, even though ill-prepared students fail to learn. Similarly, human actions are good insofar as they arise from the divine principle; they are evil insofar as they exclude this principle. ;Human actions share in the divine agency through natural inclinations, for God impresses in all creatures a desire for the good. Therefore, an action opposes the order to the divine good insofar as it opposes a natural inclination; as such, it is intrinsically evil. Thus, bestiality, which is opposed to the natural sexual inclination, is always evil. Similarly, any action directed toward the evil of an innocent person, such as killing, is always evil, for everyone naturally seeks the good in union with others; this union, however, is opposed through acts of harm. ;According to Aquinas, then, some actions, described without morally valuative terms, are intrinsically evil