No Need to Justify Induction Generally

Abstract
Our empirical beliefs beyond sense impressions and the memories of them cannot be justified. Logically we must be complete skeptics. This is the consequence of Hume’s skeptical argument against induction. Should we accept this conclusion or not? This is the so-called problem of induction. In this paper I propose a new solution that belongs to the 'dissolutionist’ tradition (Strawson 1952, Okasha 2001). Through criticizing the core argument in Hume’s skepticism I claim the following: Hume’s skepticism against induction does not succeed in denying the soundness of induction. We are not required to justify induction generally
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
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DOI wcp2220085319
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