Real and Alleged Problems for Daniels's Account of Health Justice

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (4):388-399 (2013)
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Norman Daniels’s theory of health justice is the most comprehensive and systematic such theory we have. In one of the few articles published so far on Daniels’s new book, Just Health, Benjamin Sachs argues that Daniels’s core “principle of equality of opportunity does not do the work Daniels needs it to do.” Yet Sachs’s objections to Daniels’s framework are deeply flawed. Where these arguments do not rely on significant misreadings of Daniels, they ignore sensible strands in Just Health that considerably dull their force. After disarming Sachs’s arguments against Daniels’s theory, I explain why I agree with Sachs’s conclusion: Daniels’s equality of opportunity-based account of health justice rests on shaky foundations


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J. Paul Kelleher
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Introduction.Jennifer A. Bulcock - 2013 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (4):347-351.
Aging and the prudential lifespan account.Monique Lanoix - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 24 (3):351-366.

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References found in this work

Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Just Health Care.Norman Daniels - 1985 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Realizing Rawls.Thomas W. Pogge - 1992 - Ethics 102 (2):395-396.

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