Equality

Extended Abstract After the onslaught of some Enlightenment thinkers on religion, Tocqueville was one of the most impressive philosophers who tried to reconcile modern democracy with religion. He believes liberty cannot be established without morality, and morality cannot be established without faith. For Tocqueville, religious belief is an essential bulwark of freedom. He wanted to persuade French liberals that the Catholic Church was not necessarily the enemy of freedom and French Catholics that democracy was not necessarily the enemy of the (...) Catholic Church. In his last years, Tocqueville’s pessimism about the future of liberty in France directly resulted from the stormy relationship between religion and democratic society in France. Tocqueville’s vision of religion’s enduring significance in democratic societies aligns him with those associated with “post-secular society” theories today. This article analyzes Tocqueville’s personal beliefs, the causes of his attention to religion, the relationship between religion and the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood,” the relationship between religion and materialism, the relationship between religion and freedom, and the relationship between religion and state in Tocqueville’s philosophy. As Kahan says, moral issues (concerns about human character and its development) in a democratic society were at the heart of Tocqueville’s project. In putting the question of moral character at the center of his work, Tocqueville was placing himself within a long and distinguished French tradition that reached back to writers including La Bruyère, Pascal and Corneille and continued through figures such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Chateaubriand. If Tocqueville invented a “new political science,” it was in the service of his new moral science, a science intended to encourage democratic grandeur and preserve democratic souls from degradation. For Tocqueville, democratic societies faced a choice between despotism and freedom. His new political science was intended to help them choose freedom. His new moral science was designed to help them face a parallel and related choice between moral degradation and moral greatness. As a moralist, Tocqueville aspired to be not merely democracy’s political guru but its spiritual director. Tocqueville is going to discover a road between two paths. The first path is materialism. It is concerned only with satisfying the needs of the body. The second path is spiritualism, i.e. to inflict suffering and privations on ourselves to live the life of the soul. He notices at the one end of this tendency, Heliogabalus, and at the other, St. Jerome, and he believes that the middle road (a path between Heliogabalus and St. Jerome) is the only one that can be suitable for humanity. Tocqueville believes that man can never simultaneously bear complete religious independence and full political liberty. So, he thinks that man must have faith for freedom; if he does not, he must serve, and if he is free, he must believe. As Zuckert says, in democratic times, religion can be preserved and exercise a salutary effect on morals - individual and social - only by combining it with economic calculation in public opinion, as in America. Democratic circumstances are not antagonistic to all tenets of faith. On the contrary, similar and equal people can easily understand the notion of a single God, imposing on each one of them the same rules and granting them future happiness at the same cost. However, as Zuckert says, if religious beliefs were to be propagated and preserved by such a public consensus, the doctrinaire and formal aspects antagonistic to democratic tastes would have to be minimized. It would not suffice merely to separate church and state. The content and form of religious services had to be adapted to democratic conditions. Religious leaders would also have to work to synthesize secular and sacred beliefs. Rather than stressing how concern for their eternal salvation stands in opposition to the material interests of their congregations, preachers need to recognize the dominance of public opinion and explicitly align themselves with it in an emphatically nonpartisan way. Tocqueville says Americans combat individualism with the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood.” Zuckert says this doctrine serves precisely the two functions for which Tocqueville had praised religion. Although it does not destroy the materialist desires of democratic people, it does make them pursue those interests honestly. It also works to overcome the “individualism” or isolation that economic pursuits tended to foster. The philosophers who teach this doctrine say to men that, to be happy in life, you must watch over your passions and carefully repress their excesses; that you cannot gain lasting happiness except by denying yourself a thousand passing enjoyments, and that finally, you must triumph over yourself constantly to serve yourself better. Tocqueville is not afraid to say that, of all philosophical theories, the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood” seems the most appropriate to the needs of his contemporaries. He sees it as the most powerful tool they have left to protect them from themselves. It should, therefore, be the primary focus of today’s moralists. He does not believe that the doctrine of self-interest as preached in America is self-evidently true in all respects, but it does contain many truths so evident that enlightened men cannot fail to see them. Enlighten them, therefore, regardless of the cost, for the century of blind self-sacrifice and instinctive virtue is fast receding into the past, and what he sees approaching is an age in which liberty, public peace, and social order itself will be unable to do without enlightenment. Zuckert says that if religion survived in modern egalitarian societies, Tocqueville concluded that it would result from self-interested calculations that were generally effective through the force of public opinion. The specifically religious content of “self-interest properly understood” was minimal, but irreplaceable. To convince individuals to risk their lives for the common good, beliefs in God and judgment in the afterlife are beneficial, if not indispensable. The necessary beliefs are few, simple, and, we should note, not distinctively Christian. Indeed, when Tocqueville turned to discuss the basis of individual morality, he suggested that even belief in divine retribution or punishment was not essential. Tocqueville thus minimizes the necessary content of a “civil religion” even more than Jean Jacques Rousseau did in Social Contract. He believes that most religions are only general, simple and practical means to teach men the immortality of the soul. In this respect, Tocqueville follows Montesquieu, who characterized Stoicism as a religion. Last but not least, like Montesquieu, Tocqueville also had serious doubts about the compatibility of some religions with human liberty, if for no other reason than that they do not allow for the necessary separation of religion and politics. -/- . (shrink)

Relational egalitarianism holds that people should live together as equals. We argue against the received wisdom amongst both friends and foes of relational egalitarianism that it fails to provide a theory of intergenerational justice. Instead, we argue that relational egalitarianism is concerned with social equality amongst future contemporaries, and that this commitment gives rise to duties of justice for current generations that can be grounded in the idea of generational overlap. In doing so, we argue that that the scope of (...) relational egalitarian concerns extends beyond generations amongst whom social relations exist. (shrink)

In these transformative times of interrupted lives, humanity has had to take a step back and subject its frantic, rushed existence to a profound analytical glance. The COVID pandemic has caused millions to suffer and the elderly are more vulnerable than ever; moreover, many families are left to mourn alone, not always able to gather around their departed loved ones at the time of grief. This has led many to believe that humanity has lost control of its environment and its (...) destiny. Yet, if recent predictions by sociologists come true, the current, seemingly never-ending pandemic might have some positive results. The anguish it causes may be, in fact, teaching us to appreciate the value of the natural world that we are depleting, to understand “the other”, and to recognise the planet-saving significance of the phrase “less is more”. And while the world’s populations slowly realise that their social environment has changed permanently, the pandemic’s beneficial upshot might be that people will be mindful of things beyond their immediate concerns and will begin to see the “bigger picture”. In view of the speculative disarray inherent to our present condition, this paper proposes existentialism as a system of thought with the intrinsic power to guide individual and social awareness; it thus analyses our present in an interpretive and pragmatic light while it draws on the existentialist theories of Søren Kierkegaard and Simone de Beauvoir. Both philosophers are querying and inquisitive and both timelessly relevant, sensible and direct about what they see is at the core of human existence. (shrink)

This chapter aims to make analytical political philosophy part of existing discussions about the role of numbers in the workings of political institutions that already cut across many other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. To do that, it will first explore the prominent ‘capability approach’ to justice, which is characterised by scepticism towards excessive precision in law- and policy-making. Given the close link between precision and quantification, the loudest voice from political philosophy will therefore turn out to be (...) one of warning against the use of numbers in political decision-making. However, the chapter will also discuss powerful objections to the capability approach that, building on the work of John Rawls, stress the importance of public justification and, in turn, simplifying devices in political decision-making. Those objections will be used to demonstrate that quantification can play functions that are very important from a normative perspective. To further support its claim that under certain circumstances, numerical tools might well be the best way of making political decisions, the chapter will use as a case study the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, an administrative body in charge of appraising health technology for use in the British National Health Service. (shrink)

Com uma história que ultrapassa cem anos, a ciência da mensuração da pobreza foi impulsionada pela necessidade de critérios mais sistemáticos para determinar tanto a extensão do fenômeno quanto aquelas pessoas com direito à assistência social. Discuto dois dos principais produtos dessa história: as linhas de pobreza e as abordagens para sua mensuração. As linhas separam as pessoas em pobreza ― aquelas cujo nível de carência está abaixo da linha ― daquelas fora dela ― aquelas cujo nível está acima. E (...) se pobreza é uma carência, nem todas as carências caracterizam pobreza. Não por acaso, cada abordagem se distingue por definir que tipo de carência faz da pobreza o que ela é. Aqui, apresento seis abordagens: monetária, subsistência, privação relativa, necessidades básicas, capacidades e direitos humanos. Mas entre pesquisadores, persiste a falta de consenso, seja sobre como traçar a linha de pobreza ou sobre qual abordagem é mais adequada. Relacionado a isso, concluo que diagnósticos sobre a pobreza de uma sociedade exigem o emprego não de uma, mas de diferentes medidas. (shrink)

Este libro reúne una serie de contribuciones que abordan, desde distintas disciplinas y enfoques, el diseño, la implementación y la evaluación de las políticas de protección social en América Latina. Los capítulos son reformulaciones de los problemas y respuestas presentados en el Workshop Internacional “Protección social y pobreza: abordando la multidimensionalidad del problema”, llevado a cabo en mayo de 2024. Durante el evento, se presentaron estudios sobre el impacto de los programas de transferencia de ingresos en países del Cono Sur, (...) como Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y México. La obra refleja la multidimensionalidad del problema, integrando análisis normativos, económicos y políticos, así como perspectivas etnográficas y jurídicas. A través del estudio de casos como el Programa Prospera (México), el Programa Bolsa Família (Brasil) y el programa Acompañamientos de Familia (Argentina), el libro ofrece una mirada crítica sobre los alcances y desafíos de estos programas en el contexto de la pobreza y la exclusión social en la región. A partir de estas experiencias, no solo se busca evaluar las políticas actuales, sino también reflexionar sobre estrategias futuras para enfrentar estos desafíos. (shrink)

The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender-unjust world. Rather than justifying (...) pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old-age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old-age redistribution. (shrink)

There is an "under-representation problem” in philosophy departments and journals. Empirical data suggest that while we have seen some improvements since the 1990s, the rate of change has slowed down. Some posit that philosophy has disciplinary norms making it uniquely resistant to change (Antony and Cudd 2012; Dotson 2012; Hassoun et al. 2022). In this paper, we present results from an empirical case study of a philosophy department that achieved and maintained male-female gender parity among its faculty as early as (...) 2014. Our analysis extends beyond matters of gender parity because that is only one, albeit important, dimension of inclusion. We build from the case study to reflect on strategies that may catalyze change. (shrink)

In the context of nonstandard analysis, the somewhat vague equality relation of near-equality allows us to relate objects that are indistinguishable but not necessarily equal. This relation appears to enable us to better understand certain paradoxes, such as the paradox of Theseus’s ship, by identifying identity at a time with identity over a short period of time. With this view in mind, I propose and discuss two mathematical models for this paradox.

This is a must-read text for anyone interested in the ethics surrounding gene editing. The author, a professor of clinical psychology at the University of Texas and director of their Developmental...

Recycling carbon revenues as Equal Per Capita Carbon Dividends (ECDs) is thought to neutralise the two main objections to carbon pricing, namely that it is regressive and that it hinders the poor from meeting basic needs. This article focuses on the waste objection to carbon pricing plus ECDs. If the rationale for ECDs is to protect the consumption of the worst off, why pay carbon dividends to the rich as well? I examine three different normative arguments in favour of ECDs. (...) First, the argument of common ownership of the atmosphere, which can be based on both libertarianism and isolationist egalitarianism. Second, the argument that the rich are net contributors to ECDs through their carbon taxes. Third, a consequentialist argument focusing on the pragmatic advantages of ECDs, especially in terms of social acceptability and low information costs. I conclude that none of these arguments can provide a normative justification for ECDs. (shrink)

Medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems are value-laden technologies that can simultaneously encourage and discourage conflicting values that may all be relevant for the pursuit of justice. I argue that the predominant theory of healthcare justice, the Rawls-inspired approach of Norman Daniels, neither adequately acknowledges such conflicts nor explains if and how they can resolved. By juxtaposing Daniels’s theory of healthcare justice with Axel Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s respective theories of justice, I draw attention to one such conflict. Medical AI may (...) improve the distribution of opportunity qua health while simultaneously mis-recognizing patients and thereby reducing their self-respect. I argue that justly resolving this conflict will at times require greater inclusion of those mis-recognized in deliberation about medical AI, and consider what such inclusion may entail. (shrink)

The notion of equality attracts both proponents and critics of nonmonogamy. Inequality is a widely discussed objection to nonmonogamy. Simultaneously, equality is highlighted as a core value in ethical nonmonogamy. The notions of equality and inequality in these debates have not been clearly conceptualized. In order to propose a conception of egalitarian nonmonogamy, it is important to first understand possible inequalities within it. This paper establishes a clearer and in-depth understanding of inequalities in nonmonogamy by categorizing inequalities in traditional polygamy (...) into different kinds. I argue that these inequalities are generally unjust. Although these inequalities are common in traditional polygamy, the objection that polygamy—as a type of marriage—is inherently unequal and unjust is not a convincing argument. By contrast, not all kinds of equality—such as equal love or equal number of partners—are morally significant. I conclude this paper by providing some groundwork for future research on egalitarian nonmonogamy. (shrink)

Limitarianism holds that there is an upper limit to how many resources, such as wealth and income, people can permissibly have. In this article, I examine the conceptual structure of limitarianism. I focus on the upper limit and the idea that resources above the limit are ‘excess resources’. I distinguish two possible limitarian views about such resources: (i) that excess resources have zero moral value for the holder; and (ii) that excess resources do have moral value for the holder but (...) that their claim to such resources is outweighed by other normative concerns. Moreover, I argue that, depending on the values limitarianism seeks to promote, limitarians should care about the number of people with excess resources or the total amount of excess resources (or both), that they can adopt redistributive measures and/or predistributive measures, and that some versions of limitarianism should take into account the distribution of risk among those above the riches line. (shrink)

I provide a defence of the classical liberal tradition (from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi) as a blueprint for a 'bleeding-heart libertarian' framework of society. Such a society defends three principles: 1) Freedom from private coercion (Private Property), 2) Freedom from public coercion (Limited Government); and 3) Within these limits, the provision of a limited range of public goods and public welfare (Limited Welfare State). I show that principles can be abstracted from a reading of the classical liberal (...) tradition. Then, through an extensive analysis of Locke, I show the importance, and consequentialist justifications, of the Three Principles for any liberal welfare state. Through a critique of Nozick, I show the inadequacy of the hardcore libertarian interpretation. Then, I show that John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek have all defended versions of limited welfare states. On this basis, I propose that the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a good example, supported by Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman, of a welfare principle that is compatible with bleeding-heart libertarianism. I believe we can justify, on the basis of a consequentialist theory, that the limited welfare state, which combines welfare with liberty, and the free market with a social safety net, has highly beneficial effects on the society. It thus suggests itself as a viable competitor to rights-based libertarianism and more expansive social liberalism. (shrink)

This working paper combines Lukas Schmid’s article “Responding to unauthorized residence: on a dilemma between ‘firewalls’ and ‘regularisations’” with three critical responses as well as a rejoinder by the author. Schmid argues that a set of liberal-democratic commitments gives conscientious policymakers strong reason to implement both so-called ‘firewall’ and ‘regularisation’ policies, thereby protecting unauthorised immigrants’ basic needs and interests and officially incorporating many of them in society. He then explains that the background imperative of immigration control creates a dilemmatic tension (...) between these policies, as regularisation is envisaged alongside the removal of the ineligible, which is in turn hindered by the implementation of firewalls. This creates a dilemma between the pursuit of two policy goals that are both underwritten by the same value commitments. Schmid concludes that the best way to mitigate this dilemma is to design regularisation policy in a way that leaves only a small number of unauthorised immigrants subject to removal. Antje Ellermann’s response reflects critically on Schmid’s understanding of firewalls, arguing that there is good reason to think that the presence of firewalls does not hinder the implementation of removals of unauthorised immigrants who are ineligible for regularisation. She concludes that, contrary to Schmid’s argument, there is no true ethical dilemma between firewall and regularisation policy. Adam Omar Hosein’s contribution argues that the tensions Schmid discusses arise only because of his adoption of widely shared assumptions about the proper basis for regularisation policies. He suggests they can be avoided by adopting a superior justification for regularisations: the ‘autonomy argument.’ In the last response, Cecilia Menjívar reflects on some constraints conscientious policymakers may face when dealing with ethically dilemmatic choices, such as a policy landscape of government agencies with conflicting goals as well as foreign policy and international obligations, all of which are rooted in anti-immigrant backlash and racism around the globe. The working paper concludes with a rejoinder, in which Schmid discusses the contributors’ key points, outlines agreements and disagreements, and explores the bigger picture sketched by the working paper’s discussions. (shrink)

This introduction and the contributors to this volume advance the debate on the normative relevance of historical injustice. This introduction shows that discussions on this topic should consider four aspects: first, the temporal dimension of justice; second, the connection between current claimants for reparations and the putative duty-bearers with the original perpetrators and victims of historical injustice; third, how changes in circumstances might affect what is considered just; and fourth, the appropriate form of reparation. The introduction provides an overview of (...) the contributions made by Zara Goldstone, David Heyd, Daniel Loewe, Michael Luoma and Margaret Moore, Macarena Marey and Alejandro de Oto, and David Miller. Michael Luoma and Margaret Moore argue that historical territorial injustice is somehow unique, and present a comprehensive comparison between forward-looking and backward-looking approaches. Macarena Marey and Alejandro de Oto argue that historical injustices should be seen as contemporary issues. David Heyd’s contribution posits that the non-identity problem cannot be circumvented by appealing to groups. Daniel Loewe contends that the legitimate expectations of contemporary citizens should take precedence over historical claims for the restitution of territory. David Miller assesses when and why the way in which victims of historical injustice respond to its effects is relevant to the calculation of compensation. Finally, Zara Goldstone argues that migration rights should be considered part of the reparations offered by former colonising countries to their former colonies. (shrink)

The paper argues that the concept of a civilizationally transformed state envisions a new governance paradigm that emphasizes moral values, collective responsibility, and compassion over traditional ideas of sovereignty and legality. This model emerges from the failure of conventional states to address global crises like climate change, economic instability, and democratic erosion. It proposes a state that prioritizes human dignity, justice, and the common good. Drawing from philosophical traditions such as Ubuntu, it seeks to foster mutual accountability and elevate compassion (...) as a guiding principle of governance to ensure care for the vulnerable. The 2024 Bangladeshi student-public uprising reflects this vision by rejecting repressive governance and demanding moral accountability. Realizing this transformation requires a cultural and ethical shift where the state serves as a moral authority inspiring pluralism, collective growth, and humanity's highest aspirations. (shrink)

While it is clear what those attracted to fascism today are against, it is less clear what they are for. Not in the sense of how they want to remake society—this is usually clear enough. What is less clear is the fundamental values that are driving their desire to create a different kind of order. Compounding this difficulty, too many liberals are stubbornly sticking to some conventional beliefs: that human nature is as liberals think it is, not something that is (...) fundamentally disputed; that facts are what liberals think they are, even if some people choose to ignore them; and that everybody is pursuing basically the same conception of the good, even if some of them are deluded as to where we are now and how to get where we want to go. -/- But this move to the right is not being driven simply by mistakes; it is a principled move, backed by a coherent, consistent, and historically well-sourced value system, even if this value system is perverse. Fascism has its own conception of the moral subject; of the need for a rigid social hierarchy of men; of the nature of individual rights; and of the importance of purity in blood, soil, and ideology. It believes in the unity of the people, the leader, and the state; it embraces very different and (to liberals) often disturbing moral ends; and it employs starkly different rules of social interaction. And it believes, in the end, that this all leads to the greatest expression of democracy ever invented. (shrink)

In banning religious symbols for civil servants in a position of authority, Québec's laicity law disproportionately burdens religious minorities. Nevertheless, politicians seem to somehow avoid this problem, and the law is largely supported by the population. This insensibility to religious discrimination calls for an explanation. I argue that part of the explanation for this unequal treatment of religion in secular society lies in active religious ignorance. Drawing a parallel from how white ignorance functions to protect racial inequalities, I argue that (...) a kind of active ignorance in the religious domain – that I name post-Christendom ignorance – makes it difficult to comprehend alternative understandings of religious experience and allows the majority to deny its religious positionality. Applying this framework, I criticize Québec's laicity law for wrongfully relying on inadequate hermeneutical resources about religion. Further, the failure to see that targeting only religious symbols worn by individuals is discriminatory is the result of the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness. This article aims to show how religious persons in secular society can suffer hermeneutical wrongs because of their religious identity, and it aims to show that this injustice in the epistemic domain can help explain the unequal treatment of religious minorities while providing grounds for criticism. (shrink)

Implicitly or explicitly, youth work practitioners, scholars and advocates typically invoke a set of egalitarian values to explain, justify and promote the ethical basis of their work. Despite such commitments, there exists conceptual ambiguity surrounding equality across much of the youth work literature which has significant consequences for how youth work is framed and defended. This article introduces the interdisciplinary field of Equality Studies and argues that an Equality Studies approach provides a means to (i) clarify equality-related normative goals within (...) the youth work field and (ii) enhance radically orientated youth work by strengthening the conception of equality at its core. It analyses three areas of conceptual ambiguity within the youth work literature with respect to the value of equality, in each case demonstrating how an Equality Studies approach can help remedy the problem. These areas are: (i) the assumption that equality means ‘sameness’; (ii) the limits of equality of opportunity and anti-discrimination; and (iii) the relationship between equality and other values. It then evaluates the concept of ‘equity’, arguing that it is a vague, inadequate and unnecessary vehicle for capturing egalitarian concerns. The article concludes with some comments on the feasibility of radically egalitarian youth work. (shrink)

Can people alive now have duties to future generations, the unborn millions? If so, what do we owe them? What does “justice” mean in an intergenerational context, both between people who will coexist at some point, and between generations that will never overlap? -/- In this book, Axel Gosseries provides a forensic examination of these issues, comparing and analyzing various views about what we owe our successors. He discusses links between justice and sustainability, and looks at the implications of the (...) fact that our successors’ preferences are heavily influenced by what we will actually leave them and by the education they receive. He also points to how these theoretical considerations apply to real-life issues, ranging from pension reform and Brexit to biodiversity and the climate crisis. He ends by outlining how intergenerational considerations may translate into institutional design. -/- Anyone grappling with the dilemmas of our obligations to the future, from students and scholars to policy makers and active citizens, will find this an invaluable theoretical and practical guide to this moral and political minefield. (shrink)

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified (...) substantive views about justice in outcome distributions. (shrink)

What is the relation between desert and other values such as equality, priority for the worse off, and utility? According to the common (pluralist) view, desert and these other values reflect distinct concerns: some are about distributive justice, some about retributive justice, and some (most clearly, utility) are not concerned with justice at all. However, another (monistic) view holds that while desert is a basic value, other values are merely derived from it. This controversy is relevant, for instance, to allocative (...) decisions and criminal punishment, where we need to know if other values should be balanced against desert. Yet, despite its theoretical significance and practical importance, this topic is underexplored. Aiming to fill this gap, we consider the arguments for and against the competing views. We demonstrate that the interaction between desert and other values raises a difficult dilemma: there are powerful arguments for and against both the pluralistic and the monistic accounts of desert. Indeed, we suggest that this dilemma is due to the unique nature of desert. Unlike other values, desert, especially its more robust forms, does not only sometimes conflict with competing considerations that favor different courses of actions, but rather seems to dispel other values even as pro tanto ones. (shrink)

Epistemic analyses of stereotyping describe how they lead to misperceptions and misunderstandings of social actors and events. The analyses have tended so far to focus on how people acquire stereotypes and/or how the stereotypes lead to distorted perceptions of the evidence that is available about individuals. In this chapter, I focus instead on how the stereotypes can generate misleading evidence by influencing the policy preferences of people who harbour the biases. My case study is stereotypes that relate to people living (...) in poverty. I show how these stereotypes influence policy choices in ways that generate misleading evidence about people living in poverty. I argue that the stereotypes generate the misleading evidence by supporting policies that restrict the agency of the people in poverty. In generating this misleading evidence, the stereotypes place additional constraints on the epistemic agency of everyone, making it harder for anyone, including those who do and those who do not endorse the stereotypes, to gain true beliefs about people living in poverty. Going forward, I conclude, adequate epistemic analyses of stereotyping ought to be more expansive, acknowledging both the way that stereotypes generate misleading evidence by constraining the agency of those stereotyped, and how we can all thereby be epistemically constrained by the stereotypes harboured by others. (shrink)

Scholars of international law have been increasingly troubled by states’ vast powers and practices of migrant exclusion. There is no doubt that much of this uneasiness is catalyzed by a keen sense of the demands of a basic liberalism at the international legal order's core. Indeed, the increased construction of border walls,1 the continuously widespread use of deportation as a migration control tool,2 and new digital bordering technologies3 have all come under scrutiny precisely because of the challenges they pose to (...) the notion of supposedly universal entitlements, both substantive and procedural, that often appear disabled or overridden when it comes to the treatment of different sorts of migrants. My goal in this contribution is not to add to such legal critiques, but rather to provide the contours of a broader normative argument to rebuke—or at least complicate—what is often called the state's “right to exclude” all or most would-be immigrants. This right is not just standardly assumed in legal and political practice—indeed, standardly viewed as the linchpin of sovereignty—but has also enjoyed sophisticated defense by liberal political theorists.4 The main goal of my argument is to suggest that anyone with basic liberal inclinations—including political theorists, lawyers, and practitioners of politics—should be able to agree that, under current circumstances, granting states a potent “right to exclude” entails deep tensions with basic moral standards of legitimate authority. This is because the deeply entrenched characteristics and historical background conditions of immigration control today tend structurally to push states to violate the appropriate moral conditions of their legitimate authority to enforce immigration restrictions.5 While moving above and beyond legal argumentation, my hope is that the argument may underscore and give further analytical expression to some of the animating concerns of contemporary legal contestations of states’ exclusive powers and practices. (shrink)

William Pietz’s series of articles in the journal Res during the mid-1980s, republished now and with additional chapters as The Problem of the Fetish, traced the concept of the ‘fetish’ to the enco...

When offering constructions of political values, it is common to generally strive for unity, i.e., to aim at principled definitions and the reduction of normative conflict. In this article, by contrast, I argue that we should aim to construct broad and conflicting concepts of the central liberal democratic values of liberty and equality. Taking my cue from an under-appreciated debate between Ronald Dworkin and Bernard Williams, I suggest that the demand for unity derives its appeal from a juridical model of (...) political value construction, which assumes the unified perspective of public decision-making. But while this model may be apt for constructing institutional rights, the construction of the political values liberty and equality had better operate according to a political model, which focuses on the perspective of citizens that live in a relationship of political opposition. Not only is there no demand for unity from that perspective, but there is a positive demand for political plurality: we need to draw on broad and conflicting concepts of liberty and equality if we are to respect the claims of fellow citizens with whom we have value-based political disagreements. (shrink)

Appiah distinguishes between people who are racist because they are motivated by strong ideological convictions, and those who are racist because they believe certain facts to be true. I explore to what extent this distinction might apply to those who believe in racial equality. I show that it may be risky to ignore race-related factors in the health context, while acknowledging that what constitutes race may be open to question. I discuss the idea that there are no morally relevant differences (...) between races, however construed. I show that to base one's belief in moral equality on empirical claims, is not only inherently problematic, but in most cases, is a false account of what really motivates such beliefs. Instead, I argue that we should embrace the ideological element of a belief in moral equality. Thus, instead of arguing about whether race exists, or whether there are morally relevant differences between races, (however construed), we may open a pathway to a more honest and challenging debate. That is, how can one moral ideology demonstrate its superiority over another?. (shrink)

This article contributes to ongoing discussions in the social sciences about how to interpret the incorporation of gender equality into integration policies – is it a form of state feminism or femonationalism? Drawing upon intersectionality, we analyse how gender equality is presented, discussed and negotiated in relation to ethnicity and nationality in Sweden. Methodologically, we employ a bifocal lens that combines (1) a quantitative investigation of representations of civic orientation programmes in Swedish policy documents and mainstream media, and (2) a (...) qualitative analysis of ethnographic data collected in six civic orientation courses – three in English and three in Arabic – in three large municipalities. Such a two-pronged approach, which connects policy and media discourses with interactions in civic orientation classes, offers a granular picture of the complex and often ambivalent intersections of ethnicity and gender in relation to migration in Sweden. Ultimately, the co-optation of feminist values brings with it the risk of warping feminism into a trait of national/ethnic distinctiveness. Crucially, femonationalism is not the prerogative of far-right parties but is already becoming institutionalised, informing both mainstream media and educational practices in a feminist state like Sweden. (shrink)

In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen takes to be (...) implausible for ecological reasons. I develop a new interpretation of Marx's position. On this interpretation, people in communist society achieve self-realisation through providing others with the goods and services required for their self-realisation. Coupled with a reasonably high (but not immense) development of productive power, self-realisation generates conditions in which people can produce according to their abilities and receive according to their needs. I defend this view as an interpretation of Marx and I argue that it represents a more plausible account of what makes communism possible than Cohen's interpretation in which technological advance and limitless abundance play the predominant role. (shrink)

Social or relational egalitarians try to defend democracy non-instrumentally as a constitutive element of a society where no one stands as inferior or superior to anyone else. However, they face an instrumentalist challenge from within: Why not uphold a non-democratic regime if it outperforms democracy in protecting or promoting egalitarian social relations, for example, by stably producing substantive political decisions that guard against social hierarchies? This article explores the best response to this challenge from the social egalitarian non-instrumentalist standpoint. It (...) argues that the instrumentalist challenge can be accommodated without abandoning the essential non-instrumentalist commitment to democracy; while a nondemocratic regime may be justified under less-than-ideal circumstances as a contingently effective means to realize more social equality, democracy can nevertheless be viewed as a necessary condition for the realization of full social equality. (shrink)

This book asks whether sovereignty can guarantee international equality by exploring the discourses of sovereignty and their reliance on the notions of civilisation and savagery in two historical colonial encounters: the French explorations of Canada in the 16th century and the domestic troubles linked to the Wars of Religion. Presenting the concept of 'civilised sovereignty', Mathieu reveals the interplay between the domestic and external claims to sovereignty, and offers a dynamic analysis of the theory and practice of the concept. Based (...) on extensive archival research, this book provides an in-depth intellectual picture of the theory and practice of sovereignty in early modern France by focusing on the discourses deployed by French political theorists. Mathieu applies performativity in order to denaturalise these discourses of statehood and reveals how the domestic and international constructions of sovereignty feed into one another and equally rely on appeals to civilisation and savagery. Overall, the book questions the 'myth of sovereignty as equality' and reflects on the persistence of this association despite the overwhelming empirical evidence that it institutes international hierarchies and inequalities. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of (...) reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need for (...) justification altogether or by reframing justification in either ostensive or coherentist fashion, showing that each fails to account for our sense that basic equality is objectively true. In response, I outline a Hegelian approach that treats the commitment to basic equality as a social fact that constrains philosophical reasoning in contemporary liberal democracies. By itself that might suggest complacent conservatism or cultural relativism, but I argue that practices and institutions that reflect and foster a commitment to basic equality have a distinct value in permitting reciprocal recognition and thereby enabling us to make a distinct class of normative claims on one another. This Hegelian resolution of the problem is dialectically superior to its rivals and therefore warrants further development. (shrink)

This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude toward envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy poses to political stability. Yet he also briefly discusses the kind of envy that individuals experience toward their social peers, which he calls particular envy, and which I refer to as peer envy. He quickly concludes, however, that particular envy would not present a serious risk to the stability of his just society. In this article, I contest (...) this claim by arguing that the principles that structure Rawls’s ideal society are likely to exacerbate particular envy to a politically risky extent. Section 1 reconstructs his account of envy, giving special attention to his belief that competition kindles envy between peers. Section 2 then examines the way in which Rawls often endorses rivalry within the body politic. I argue that the society governed by justice as fairness is, on account of this rivalry, likely to generate a politically problematic degree of particular envy. In Section 3, I invoke ancient Greece as an example of a society that was, as a result of its intense competitiveness, often imperiled by dangerously elevated levels of peer envy. I then survey the key institutional mechanisms by which the ancient Greeks sought to manage this hazardous emotion. It turns out, however, that most of these mechanisms would be unavailable to Rawls insofar as they starkly contravene his principles of justice. I conclude that if Rawlsians wish to establish a society that fosters rivalry, they would do well to reflect on the means by which peer envy can be effectively harnessed. (shrink)

This article offers a solution to the numbers problem within an individualist moral framework. Its central aims are as follows: to rescue individualist moral theories, such as moral contractualism, from their long-standing problem with interpersonal aggregation; to demonstrate how, proceeding from an individualist mode of justification, we can nevertheless make the numbers count without directly counting the numbers; to provide an individualist rationale for accepting a partially aggregative criterion of adjudication for resolving interpersonal trade-offs; and finally, to develop an extensionally (...) adequate version of partial aggregation that finds application in more structurally complex cases. (shrink)

I hope to demonstrate the value of a close reading Williams’s ‘Internal and External Reasons’, and to provide a theory of error regarding the substantial body of work which seeks to, in various ways, defang the essay. I do this by providing some historical context for the paper, and sketching where, historically, internalism and certain sorts of moral realism became separated. It will likely not surprise the reader when I suggest that the modern scientific worldview has an important place in (...) the discussion of the notion of external reasons. As mind, motivation, and perception have become less opaque to us, certain avenues for explaining our reasons have come closer to relying on hypotheses which may turn out to be falsifiable, and have thus been abandoned. What may come as more of a surprise is my suggestion that modern egalitarianism is an important factor as well. I suggest that impersonal reason has been used as an (implausible, but perhaps well-intentioned) alternative to the practice of some inflicting their reasons on others. (shrink)

Volume 31, Issue 2, June 2024, Page 120-125.

An enduring theme of Western philosophy is that we are all one another’s equals. Yet the principle of basic equality is woefully under-explored in modern moral and political philosophy. What does it mean to say we are all one another’s equals? Jeremy Waldron confronts this question fully and unflinchingly in a major new multifaceted account.

This chapter considers whether the approach of the justice system to women who manifest their faith through the wearing of the niqab (face veil) serves to marginalise this group. Court decisions in cases where women have wished to retain their niqab whilst giving evidence have often recognised the importance of the religious right but then treated it as being subservient to the right of the opposing party to a fair trial. This chapter will argue that this argument is misplaced as (...) the niqab does not obstruct the ability of the court to assess the credibility of the witness. Whilst judges deciding on such cases have limited discretion to interfere with existing practices, governments do, and there should be clear guidance to ensure that religious minorities are not deterred from asserting their legal rights in the courts. (shrink)