Analysis 38 (3):135 - 136 (1978)

Abstract
In his article "rigid designation" ("journal of philosophy", Volume lxxii, Pages 363-9) hugh s chandler presents an alleged counterexample to the principles that proper names are rigid designators and that identity statements using proper names as designators are non-Contingent. In the present paper this counterexample is shown to rest on a tacit assumption which the principles' proponents need not accept. Chandler's example is redescribed in a way which is both plausible and compatible with the two principles
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DOI 10.1093/analys/38.3.135
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