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Rosanna Keefe
University of Sheffield
  1. Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this book, first published in 2000, Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories (...)
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  2. Vagueness: A Reader.Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.) - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms -- such as 'tall', 'red', 'bald', and 'tadpole' -- have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate.This anthology collects for the first time the most important papers in the field. After a substantial introduction that surveys (...)
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  3.  19
    Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):491-494.
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  4. Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):460-462.
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  5. What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
    Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I (...)
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  6. Vagueness Without Context Change.Rosanna Keefe - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):275-292.
    In this paper I offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. Such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is (...)
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  7. Vagueness: Supervaluationism.Rosanna Keefe - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.
  8.  5
    Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392-394.
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  9. Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same.Rosanna Keefe - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a solution, nor (...)
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  10.  77
    Vagueness by Numbers.Rosanna Keefe - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):565-579.
    Degree theories of vagueness build on the observation that vague predicates such as 'tall' and 'red' come in degrees. They employ an infinite-valued logic, where the truth values correspond to degrees of truth and are typically represented by the real numbers in the interval [0,1]. In this paper, the success with which the numerical assignments of such theories can capture the phenomenon of vagueness is assessed by drawing an analogy with the measurement of various physical quantities using real numbers. I (...)
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  11. Supervaluationism, Indirect Speech Reports, and Demonstratives.Rosanna Keefe - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Can supervaluationism successfully handle indirect speech reports? This chapter considers, and rejects, Schiffer’s claim that they cannot. One alleged problem with indirect speech reports is that the truth of “Carla said that Bob is tall” implausibly requires that Carla said all of a huge number of precise things (i.e. that Bob was over n feet tall, for values of n corresponding to precisifications of “tall”). The paper shows why the supervaluationist is not committed to this. Vague singular terms are no (...)
     
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  12. Contingent Identity and Vague Identity.Rosanna Keefe - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):183 - 190.
    Evan's influential argument against vague objects (_Analysis<D>, 1978) has a parallel directed against contingent identity. I argue that Noonan failed in his attempt to accept Evans's argument but save contingent identity by establishing a disanalogy between the two arguments (in The Philosophical Quarterly 1991). Instead, I suggest an alternative way to block the argument against contingent identity and argue that its analogue provides a satisfactory response to Evans's original argument.
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  13.  12
    Supervaluationism and Validity.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28:93-106.
    This paper explores several different accounts of validity within the supervaluationist framework that coincide in the absence of the D operator but differ once that operator is introduced. It argues that the alternatives have different advantages and suggests a form of a pluralism about notions of validity within the supervaluationist framework.
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  14.  85
    Supervaluationism and Validity.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):93-105.
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    When Does Circularity Matter?Rosanna Keefe - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270.
    This paper asks whether a good philosophical account of something can ever be circular. It explores the kind of circumstances in which an account of F might involve F itself while still serving the functions of and meeting the requirements on a philosophical account. The paper discusses two criteria for acceptable circularity, based on ideas from Humberstone 1997. And it illustrates the surprisingly wide variety of kinds of accounts in which circularity need not be bad.
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  16.  34
    Prefaces, Sorites and Guides to Reasoning.Rosanna Keefe - 2021 - In Conditionals, Paradox and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford, UK: pp. 212-226.
    Is there an interesting relation between the Preface paradox and the Sorites paradox that might be used to illuminate either or both of those paradoxes and the phenomena of rationality and vagueness with which they, respectively, are bound up? In particular, if we consider the analogy alongside a familiar response to the Preface Paradox that employs degrees of belief, does this give any support to the thought that we should adopt some kind of degree-theoretic treatment of vagueness and the sorites? (...)
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  17. Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites.Rosanna Keefe - 2004 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
     
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  18. Modelling Vagueness: What Can We Ignore?Rosanna Keefe - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470.
    A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists’ numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the (...)
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  19.  88
    II—Modelling Higher-Order Vagueness: Columns, Borderlines and Boundaries.Rosanna Keefe - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):89-108.
    According to columnar higher-order vagueness, all orders of vagueness coincide: any borderline case is a borderline borderline case, and a third-order borderline case, etc. Bobzien has worked out many details of such a theory and models it with a modal logic closely related to S4. I take up a range of questions about the framework and argue that it is not suitable for modelling the structure of vagueness and higher-order vagueness.
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  20. Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. [REVIEW]Rosanna Keefe - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):466-470.
  21.  68
    Vagueness. By Timothy Williamson. [REVIEW]Rosanna Keefe - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392-394.
    If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal turns (...)
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  22. Teaching & Learning Guide For: Vagueness: Supervaluationism.Rosanna Keefe - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):213-215.
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  23.  60
    Degrees of Belief, Expected and Actual.Rosanna Keefe - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3789-3800.
    A framework of degrees of belief, or credences, is often advocated to model our uncertainty about how things are or will turn out. It has also been employed in relation to the kind of uncertainty or indefiniteness that arises due to vagueness, such as when we consider “a is F” in a case where a is borderline F. How should we understand degrees of belief when we take into account both these phenomena? Can the right kind of theory of the (...)
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  24. Unsolved Problems with Numbers: Reply to Smith.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):291-293.
  25. Relative Validity and Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2010 - In T. J. Smiley, Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver (eds.), The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge.
     
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  26.  58
    Special Issue on Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe & Libor Běhounek - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (3):287-289.
  27.  11
    'The Concept of Ignorance' in Jean-Paul Sartre's Notebooks for an Ethics and Truth and Existence.Terry Keefe & Rosanna Keefe - 2001 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 32 (1):66-80.
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  28.  40
    Vagueness and Language Clusters.Rosanna Keefe - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):611 – 620.