Indexical Relativism versus genuine relativism

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare two forms any relativist thesis can take: indexical relativism and genuine relativism. Indexical relativists claim that the implicit indexicality of certain sentences is the only source of relativity. Genuine relativists, by contrast, claim that there is relativity not just at the level of sentences, but also at propositional level. After characterizing each of the two forms and discussing their difficulties, I argue that the difference between the two is significant.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is Relativism Self-Defeating?Harold Zellner - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:287-295.
How to spell out genuine relativism and how to defend indexical relativism.Max Kölbel - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 - 288.
Relativism (and expressivism) and the problem of disagreement.James Dreier - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
842 (#18,524)

6 months
21 (#133,350)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Max Kölbel
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.

View all 87 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

View all 22 references / Add more references