Lost feeling of ownership of one’s mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.’s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493 (2016)

Authors
Stanely Bernard Klein
University of California at Santa Barbara
Abstract
In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature on felt loss of ownership of one’s intentional objects.
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References found in this work BETA

Memory and Consciousness.Endel Tulving - 1985 - Canadian Psychology 26:1-12.
What Memory Is.Stan Klein - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 6 (1):1-38.
Episodic Memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human.Endel Tulving - 2005 - In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-56.

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