Lost feeling of ownership of one’s mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.’s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493 (2016)
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Abstract

In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature on felt loss of ownership of one’s intentional objects.

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Author's Profile

Stanley Bernard Klein
University of California, Santa Barbara

References found in this work

Memory and consciousness.Endel Tulving - 1985 - Canadian Psychology 26:1-12.
What memory is.Stan Klein - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 6 (1):1-38.
The stream of thought.William James - 1890 - In The Principles of Psychology. London, England: Dover Publications.
Descriptive Psychology.Franz Brentano - 1982/1995 - Routledge.

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