Abstract

Hume's theory of justice is important because it provides a plausible naturalistic justification of private property rights. It also provides a serious alternative to both Lockean and Hobbesian theories of ownership. In Hume convention replaces both the state and natural rights as the legitimate origin of "mine and thine." Furthermore, the moral significance of conventions distinguishes Hume from both utilitarian and Rawlsian accounts of justice However, Hume's focus on conventions brings with it an allegedly serious difficulty. ;According to Hume, self-interest motivates individuals to form and comply with conventions for the stability of possession. These conventions are the origin of property rights. The argument that self-interest motivates individuals to both establish moral rules, and then follow them, faces a serious problem. Self-interest also leads agents to violate property rights. Hume recognizes this problem with the persona of the sensible knave. The sensible knave acknowledges that honesty is the best policy, but an agent would do better for herself by following the general rule and taking advantage of all the exceptions. The central question for Hume's theory of justice is, then, how can conventions of property arise and continue in the presence of sensible knaves. This dissertation shows that Hume's theory of justice is not threatened by the existence of sensible knaves. Hume's theory never requires self-interest to motivate everyone all of the time to respect property. Hume's argument is that only enough people, enough of the time, need to respect the possessions of others in order for property rights to arise. This dissertation shows how self-interest motivates individuals to form conventions of property, and how these conventions become moral rules that can withstand the challenges individual defectors present