Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):59-70 (2008)
Abstract
Adam Smith and Thomas Reid follow Joseph Butler's lead in discussing the moral significance of resentment in great detail. David Hume does not. For Smith and Reid, resentment reveals shortcomings in Hume's attempt to ground justice solely in terms of self-interest and public utility. This can be seen most clearly in Reid's critique of Hume's response to the sensible knave. Reid argues that Hume's appeal to our integrity can have force only if Hume concedes that there are elements of justice that are grounded in neither self-interest nor public utility
Keywords Hume
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DOI 10.3366/E1479665108000080
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Thomas Reid Today.Esther Engels Kroeker - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):95-114.

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