Frames and concepts in the philosophy of science

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2):225-251 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the philosophy of science, the frame model is used in order to represent and analyze scientific concepts and conceptual change. However, the potential of the frame model is far from being fully exploited: Up to now, the frame model is only applied to a rather small set of different kinds of concepts and important advantages of the frame model for reconstructing and analyzing concepts have been neglected. In this article, we will essentially extend the frame model in the following way: We will develop a frame-based approach for representing a comprehensive class of different kinds of concepts including conjunctively and disjunctively defined concepts, family resemblance concepts, prototype concepts, operationalized concepts, dual concepts integrating two different ways of concept determination, and theoretical concepts. In order to do so, we will define different kinds of frames with respect to the logical structure of the kind of concept that is represented by a particular frame. We will exemplify our approach by means of ten frames applied to standard cases of conceptual analyses in philosophy and cognitive science as well as to scientific concepts of political science, psychology, linguistics and physics.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Capturing Dynamic Conceptual Frames.Rafal Urbaniak - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (3):430-455.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Concepts and the Innate Mind.Eric A. Margolis - 1995 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Die Tripelstruktur der Begriffe.W. Balzer & V. Kuznetsov - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):21 - 43.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-08

Downloads
39 (#406,659)

6 months
5 (#626,659)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Determinables in Frames.David Hommen - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):291-310.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Testability and Meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 2011 - Literary Licensing, LLC.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Testability and meaning (part 1).Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):420-71.

View all 25 references / Add more references