Abstract
A satisfactory theory of “strong evaluation” should manage to do
two things: first of all, make sense of the distinction between
impersonal ethical issues and personal orientation. Secondly,
the deontic layer of reasons and norms should be taken into account, among
other things because the central indicators of strong evaluation, namely
praise and blame, presuppose norms and reasons as standards of
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
These two desiderata seem to pull in different directions. The
suggested analysis of the deontic layer in terms of external, value-based
reasons for action may make it seem even more difficult to allow for
reasons of one’s own. I argue that there can be reasons of one’s
own, depending on one’s orientations, commitments and the actual shape
of one’s affective-conative responses. First I discuss the general reasons
that decisions and commitments create, and general (stance-insensitive)
reasons for making a commitment to X. These suffice as a reply to
MacIntyre’s worry (9.2).
Yet the picture can be developed further. Drawing on the idea of
exclusionary reasons (introduced in 9.1), I discuss the general reasons for having an
orientation of one’s own and the difference between an orientation to
the good and a commitment to a good. The difference is the role they have
as reasons for action. Commitments play a stronger role in practical
reasoning because they are exclusionary reasons (9.3). Then I turn to
non-uniformity and stance-sensitivity of reasons, and ask whether
different people have stance-sensitive reasons to make different commitments
(9.4). In the last section I analyze more closely the nature of
personal resonance and the difference it may make (9.5).